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THE NONDEMOCRATIC BENEFITS OF ELECTIONS - THE CASE
OF CAMBODIA
Nhan T. Vu*
I. INTRODUCTION
WHEN ONE THINKS OF THE ADMINISTRATION of free and fair elec-
tions' there is a tendency to concentrate on one possible electoral benefit
- democracy. Scholars have written much literature on the possibility for
democracy, how to bring about democracy, and what constitutes democra-
cy.2 However, democracy is only the most obvious possible product of
elections. The holding of elections may have benefits other than the
* Associate, Russin & Vecchi, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. J.D., Yale Law School
(1995); A.B., Harvard University (1992). I would like to thank Professor George Priest
and Professor Owen Fiss of the Yale Law School for their helpful comments and
encouragement. I would also like to thank the Ford Foundation for its research grant
which allowed me to travel to Cambodia to study this subject firsthand. This Article
was originally to be published in late 1995, but was delayed due to technical difficul-
ties. The views expressed are my own, as are all errors contained within the Article.
' Unless otherwise stated, in this Article, the word "elections" refers to elections
that are free and fair. "Free and fair" is a specialized term in international law
denoting an election that substantially represents the will of the people. See infra text
accompanying notes 287-90; see also 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) art. 21, para. 1; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368; International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6
I.L.M. 360; Larry Garber, Guidelines for International Election Observing (1984); W.
Michael Reisman, International Election Observation, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1992);
David Padilla & Elizabeth Houppert, International Election Observing: Enhancing the
Principle of Free and Fair Elections, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 71 (1993); Michelle
Evans & Darilyn T. Olidge, What Can the, Past Teach the Future? Lessons from
Internationally Supervised Self-Determination Elections 1920-1990, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 1711 (1992); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in
International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992); David Stoelting, The Challenge of
U.-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 371 (1992).
2 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION
(1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DEMOCRA-
CY AND DICrATORSHIP (1966); GUnLiERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMrrrER,
TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHOrrARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN
DEMOCRACIES (1986); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J. P. Mayer
ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1988).
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creation of a democratic political system.3
The elections held in Cambodia from May 23-28, 1993, under the
auspices of the United Nations provide a good example. As Cambodia
entered the 1990s, the likelihood that a stable democratic government4
could be formed was minuscule according to any theory of democracy
formation.5 The economy was in a shambles, the people of Cambodia
had no experience with democracy, and the major parties in Cambodia all
had the means to ignore the call for democracy and continue their armed
conflict.
The economy, which had never been well-developed in the first
place, took a step backward due to the fighting and the forced
agrarianization of the urban centers by the Khmer Rouge during their
four-year rule. The economy was largely agrarian with little industry other
than resource-stripping activities such as lumber cutting and gem mining.
It seemed unlikely that the people of Cambodia had achieved the standard
' For an opposing opinion, see Richard D. Fisher, Averting A Failure of U.N.
Peacekeeping in Cambodia, HERT. FOUND. REP., Dec. 15, 1992, at 1, asking President
Clinton "[n]ot [to] equate UNTAC's success with merely holding elections. The U.N.'s
success must be judged on Cambodia's successful transition to democracy."
' There is a difference between a democracy and a stable democracy. Technically,
Cambodia is a democracy since the government in power was chosen in democratic
elections and has evinced an intention to continue governing the country through
democratic means. However, one way to answer the question of whether a country is
democratic is to take a snapshot of the political conditions in that country. In contrast,
the term "stable democracy" connotes some sort of extended time period. Although I
use the term "stable democracy" to mean any democracy that has a substantial chance
of remaining democratic in the near future, the term stable democracy has no inherent
definition. One noted expert on democracy has suggested a two-turnover test, requiring
that the party in power relinquish control of the government at least two times to the
victorious opposition party before one can say that a democratic system of governance
has a good chance of success. HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 266-67.
' Most theories of democracy formation fit into two categories: theories which de-
pend upon socioeconomic factors and theories which depend upon psychological factors.
Those relying on socioeconomic factors link democracy to prosperity; i.e., prosperity
increases leisure time, education, free press, and other commodities which increase the
likelihood of democracy. See, e.g., SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN (1960);
Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Corre-
lates, in POLmcs AND SOCIAL Lim, 569 (Nelson W. Polsby et al. eds., 1963).
Theories dependent upon psychological factors argue that expectations of and acclima-
tion to concepts of democracy are important. Thus, they emphasize prior experience
with democracy. They also look to the diversity level of a society to see if the people
are accustomed to openly airing dissension or solving problems through compromise.
See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GovERNs? (1961); VALDnIER 0. KEY, JR., PUBIC
OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1961).
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of living necessary to provide them the surplus leisure time and income
necessary to educate themselves about and participate in democratic
processes. And to make matters worse, almost everyone with the techni-
cal, professional, and political skills necessary to bring economic improve-
ment to Cambodia had been killed by the Khmer Rouge or had fled to
other countries.
Furthermore, with one brief exception,6 the Cambodian people had
never experienced any sort of truly democratic government. Of the four
major Cambodian factions, none had any experience with democracy.7
Each of the factions had controlled the country at one time or another
and all had used nondemocratic or sham-democratic8 forms of gover-
nance. Thus, it was more likely that the Cambodian leaders would subvert
any democratic processes for their own purposes rather than abide by the
will of the people. And even if the elites did not destroy the democratic
process, there was no way to predict whether the Cambodian people
would participate in elections in a meaningful and useful manner.
In fact, armed conflict had long been the standard means of resolv-
ing disputes in Cambodia. There had been over twenty years of civil war,
interrupted only by four years of "peace" filled with terror and mass
murder.9 It is estimated that in the latter period, the Khmer Rouge killed
at least one million persons out of a population of approximately six to
eight million."0 Although Vietnam had withdrawn all of its troops and
6 The elections held in 1955 after Cambodia gained its independence from the
French were probably free and fair under the standards of international law. See infra
text accompanying notes 55-59.
' It is true, however, that, in the opinion of this author, all the factions currently
support some sort of economic and political liberalization, at least in word.
' By "sham-democratic," I mean a government that uses democratic rhetoric but
does not allow its citizens true political choice in their governance.
' Although the well-publicized activities of the Khmer Rouge during their reign are
often referred to as "genocide," that is not technically correct. "Genocide" has tradi-
tionally referred to situations in which persons of one race or nationality have systemat-
ically killed persons of another race or nationality. If genocide merely denoted causing
death on a massive scale, most major wars would be genocidal. The actions of the
Khmer Rouge are, therefore, genocide when committed against ethnic Vietnamese, but
are "mass murders" when committed against ethnic Cambodians.
"0 The estimates of the numbers of those murdered vary greatly. The People's Re-
public of Kampuchea, the Cambodian government installed by the Vietnamese after they
defeated the Khmer Rouge, estimated three million dead. DONALD M. SEEKINGS,
HisToRIcAL SETING IN CAMBODIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 51 (Russell R. Ross ed., 3d
ed. 1990). The U.S. Department of State lists 1.2 million persons killed. Id. The Khmer
Rouge admit to between 800,000 and 1 million deaths during their rule. Id. The total
population of Cambodia at the time of the Khmer Rouge takeover in April, 1975 can
also only be estimated since the last census occurred in 1962. It was estimated at 7.1
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the various Cambodian factions had agreed to a cease-fire and elections,
the fact remained that animosity ran high among the four competing
Cambodian parties and each of the factions was heavily armed. Democra-
cy in Cambodia seemed a remote possibility. Ngeth Suphan, a Harvard-
educated civil administrator for Thmar Pouk Province in Cambodia, made
the point quite succinctly, "Nothing good can come out of it [democra-
cy] ... it is too premature for my people. The leaders do not understand
about democracy. They want power."'"
But Mr. Ngeth may have been wrong. Holding elections may be
worthwhile even in countries where the likelihood of establishing a stable
democratic government is low. There may be other electoral benefits.
These benefits are not unforeseen byproducts of elections, but rather stem
from a primary electoral function. Quite simply, free and fair elections
legitimize. 2 Those parties or politicians who participate, and especially
those who do well and gain a place in the government are legitimized,
even if they do not receive a majority of the votes. Those who choose
not to participate are delegitimized, making them vulnerable to the loss of
both domestic and foreign support. Finally, the elections may give politi-
cal power to those already in possession of political legitimacy. All of
these are important because they change the power structure of the
country and the decision matrixes faced by elites of that country. 3
million in 1972. Id.
" Lindsay Murdoch, Khmer Rouge Lays Plans for Future in Cambodia, THE AGE
(Melbourne), May 29, 1993, at 9.
" To "legitimize" means to confer "legitimacy," which I will define as the rec-
ognition by others or oneself that one has the right to exert a specific type of power
or otherwise take certain actions. Thus, political legitimacy is the recognition that one
has the right to exert political power. One component of political legitimacy is based
on ideological and political support that can be measured in terms of popularity. Those
with political legitimacy domestically would be expected to do well in elections. Those
with political legitimacy internationally can expect to receive signs of support from the
international community (e.g., resolutions of support from the General Assembly or the
Security Council of the United Nations, economic or military aid, recognition, dip-
lomatic relations, etc.). However, this does not exclude recognition by other individuals
or parties that a person or organization has the right to exert power, even if the rec-
ognizer opposes the ideology or policies of the recognized. By "political power," I
mean the ability to exercise those functions usually reserved for governments (i.e.,
governance). In some countries, such as the United States, this may require being
elected to the Presidency or Congress or being appointed to the judiciary. In other
countries, it may require becoming Secretary General of the Communist Party, and in
others, the highest-ranking officer of the armed forces.
" By "power structure," I mean the distribution of political, military, and economic
power among the factions. By "decision matrix," I mean the calculations used by
entities to make decisions and the criteria factored into those calculations.
398 [V/ol. 28:395
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In Cambodia, there were three such legitimacy-based benefits that
came about as a result of the elections. First, the Khmer Rouge lost much
of its international and domestic support. Second, the other Cambodian
parties have banded together into a legitimate and functioning government
that has been able to administer the country. Finally, the individual in
Cambodia who possessed the greatest amount of political legitimacy,
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, has been given political power. Note that none
of these events is directly related to the formation of a stable democratic
form of government.
However, one should not despair of ever achieving the formation of
a stable democracy in Cambodia. To the contrary, this Article will argue
that the benefits that were described above are conducive to the continua-
tion of democracy in Cambodia. If this is true, then free and fair elec-
tions may be more important for Cambodia than we may have originally
believed. Because of the multitude of seemingly intractable problems, the
odds do not favor democracy in Cambodia in the long-run. However, the
nondemocratic benefits of elections that have been mentioned can increase
stability and prosperity, which would help shore up Cambodia's fragile
democracy. Without such advantages, it would be difficult to imagine
why a country whose recent history has been so troubled would suddenly
be able to govern itself by a system of governance requiring trust,
restraint, and compromise. In Cambodia, Clauswitz's theory is reversed,
politics is an extension of war,14 and the various factions have been
fighting a brutal life or death struggle for the last half-century. However,
there is reason to hope that politics in Cambodia in the years to come
will not be like war in Cambodia in the years that have just passed.
IX. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In order to understand the current situation in Cambodia, it is
necessary to understand Cambodia's past. Therefore, what follows will be
an abridged history of Cambodia.
At its apogee under King Jayavarman VII in the late twelfth century
and early thirteenth century, the Kingdom of Kambuja (as it was then
called) encompassed parts of what is today Malaysia, Thailand, Laos,
Southern Vietnam, and Central Vietnam. 5 Unfortunately, centuries of
mismanagement and internal fighting brought about the decline of the
empire. Coinciding with Cambodia's loss of power was the rise of two
powerful neighbors: Thailand to the west and Vietnam to the east. The
,4 CARL VON CLAUSWrTZ, ON WAR 119 (Anatol Rapoport ed., 1982). "We see,
therefore, that War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a
continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means." Id.
15 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 11.
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major turning point for the Cambodian empire was the sacking of the
famous temples at Angkor Wat by the Thais in 1353.6
After this point in time, Cambodia gradually ceased to be an inde-
pendent player in Southeast Asia and became the puppet of its more
powerful neighbors. Internal strife amongst the Cambodian royal family
often led one faction to seek aid from Thailand and the other to beseech
Vietnam. Of course, the price of such help would always be the ceding
of provinces or counties along the border. In this way, the Vietnamese
annexed the Vam Co River Basin and the Mekong Delta (including the
Cambodian fishing Village of Prey Nokor - now known as Saigon or
Ho Chi Minh City). 7 The decline in Cambodian power also coincided
with a southward migration of the Vietnamese that started when they
gained independence from China in the tenth century.'" The settlers who
made up the Nam Tien (Southward March), as the movement was called,
were motivated by the population pressures in northern Vietnam and the
expansionist aims of the Vietnamese emperor.'9 It was this expansion
that made Cambodians so suspicious of the Vietnamese. Often, the
Vietnamese would settle on Cambodian land before it became Vietnamese
land."
The ascension of Emperor Nguyen Anh to the Vietnamese throne in
1802 is a watershed event of Vietnamese history. Considered to be the
beginning of the modem era in Vietnam,2' it marked the unification of
power in the country at a time when Vietnam's territories were larger
than ever.' With little internal strife to hinder national development, the
16 Id. at 12.
" NAYAN CHANDA, BROTHER ENEMY 51 (1986).
'8 Id. at 49.
'9 THU-HUONG NGUYEN-VO, KHMER-VIET RELATIONS AND THE THIRD INDOCHINA
CoNFLIcr 1-3 (1992). Those moving southward left the rigid, institutionalized society
of the north in search of land and opportunities in the south. Id.
CHANDA, supra note 17, at 51.
2, Professor Hue-tam Ho-tai of Harvard University believes this event marks the
beginning of the modem era. Professor Alexander Barton Woodside believes that the
Tay Son rebellion, which occurred just before the rise of Nguyen Anh to power,
"inaugurates modem Vietnamese history." ALEXANDER BARTON WOODSIDE, VIErNAM
AND THE CHINESE MODEL: A COMARATIVE STUDY OF VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE
GOVERNMENT IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 3 (1971).
2 Nguyen Anh defeated the Tay Son brothers, commoners who had led a successful
peasant revolt lasting from 1771 to 1787 that left them in control of all of Vietnam.
Id. at 2-3. Before that time, Vietnam was ruled by two noble families. Id. Although
Vietnam had a nominal royal family, power was really in the hands of the Trinh in
the north and the Nguyen in the south and center. Id. Nguyen Anh was of the Nguyen
family. Id.
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Vietnamese moved in earnest to populate the entire Mekong Delta,
encompassing the solithem-most part of modem-day Vietnam.
At the same time, Vietnam continued to take an active interest in
Cambodia. Having learned a cultural lesson from China, Vietnam saw it-
self as the refined Middle Kingdom whose role it was to bring culture
and education to the "barbarians" of Cambodia. Cambodia was to be the
vassal state of Vietnam, paying homage to the Vietnamese emperor.'
Many Vietnamese officials were sent to Cambodia to teach Vietnamese
ways to the Cambodians.24 The Cambodians' reaction to these assimila-
tion efforts was the instigation of numerous rebellions. The Vietnamese
emperor, incensed at the "ungrateful" attitude of the Cambodians put
down the rebellions ruthlessly.' Neither the attempts at assimilation nor
the brutal responses to rebellion assuaged the Cambodians' fear that the
Vietnamese wanted to control them if not annex Cambodia outright.
It is likely that this course of events would have continued if the
French had not conquered Vietnam in the second half of the 19th Centu-
ry. The French colonialists sought a trade route to China, converts to
Catholicism, and ways to check the British in their colonial efforts. The
French attacked and took over parts of southern Vietnam in 1862 and
eventually controlled all of Vietnam by 1882.' The Cambodians were
hardly in a position to resist the French. After all, they were weaker than
the Vietnamese, whom the French had already defeated once. In 1863, the
French and Cambodians signed an agreement under which Cambodia
became a protectorate of France.'
Although the French stopped outright Vietnamese expansion onto
Cambodian land, their administration of the region was not always looked
upon with favor by the Cambodians. French Indochina was considered
one administrative unit under the French ministry of colonies and encom-
passed all of Laos; Cambodia; CochinChina (southern Vietnam); Annam
(central Vietnam); and Tonkin (northern Vietnam).29  Because
CochinChina was a French colony" the French drew the CochinChina-
23Id. at 234-41.
24 CHANDA, supra note 17, at 51-52.
2 Id. at 52.
2 Id. at 53.
' SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 16.
2 Id.
29 STANLEY KARNOW, VIErNAM 88 (1983).
" Id. at 87. By comparison, Cambodia, Laos, Tonkin, and (Annam) were protector-
ates. This meant that they were under the nominal control of their respective national
emperors. In reality, however, the French controlled the royal family, giving emperors
instructions and replacing any who refused to follow orders. Id.
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Cambodia boundary in CochinChina's favor.3' And because the French
could not find enough Cambodians with the requisite administrative skills,
many of the administrators in Cambodia were Vietnamese.32 All of these
actions no doubt caused the Cambodians to feel as if the Vietnamese
were still attempting to dominate them, albeit with more subtlety than in
the past.
It is no wonder then, that Cambodians display such antipathy to-
wards the Vietnamese. This animosity is a part of Cambodian life even
today. Mothers caution their children to be careful of the Vietnamese,
whom they call Yuon (a Cambodian pejorative word meaning roughly,
"foreign barbarian"). 33 Children may be told the story of the construction
of the Vinh Te Canal - a Vietnamese project completed with forced
Cambodian labor. According to the story, three Cambodians were pun-
ished by being buried up to their heads for not working hard enough.
Their heads were then used to prop up a pot in which water was boiled.
When they squirmed and writhed in pain, spilling the water, the Vietnam-
ese scolded them saying "Don't spill the master's tea." Stories like this
one would later be used by the Khmer Rouge to whip up anti-Vietnamese
sentiment.
Although the Thais have also meddled in Cambodian affairs and
were responsible for the sacking of Angkor Wat, the Cambodians do not
view them with the same suspicion with which they view the Vietnamese.
First, the Thais have not encroached on Cambodian territory as much as
the Vietnamese, especially in modem times.35 Second, the Thais have a
culture derived from India, meaning that they are ethnically and culturally
more similar to the Cambodians than the sinocized Vietnamese. 36 Finally,
the Thais did not possess the cultural evangelism of the Vietnamese.
While the Vietnamese envisioned changing the Cambodians' way of life,
the Thais only wanted their loyalty and tribute.38
The Cambodians' antipathy continued into the anti-colonial era. The
beginnings of formal Communism in Indochina start with the creation of
the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 1930.39 Most of this early
development was driven by the Vietnamese and thus, much of the early
31 CHANDA, supra note 17, at 54.
32 Id. at 56.
3 Id. at 52.
34 NGUYEN-VO, supra note 19, at ix.
35 GARY KLINTWORTH, VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION IN CAMBODIA IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 2 (1989) [hereinafter VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION].
3 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 15.
37 WOODSIDE, supra note 21, at 239.
m SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 15; see also id.
39 Id., at 36.
402 (V/ol. 28:395
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membership of the ICP was Vietnamese. Aware that the overbroad
geographic reach of the party might lead some to argue that the ICP was
a cover for a Vietnamese takeover of Cambodia and Laos, the Communist
movement split into three national components in 1951.' Nonetheless,
the new Khmer People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) had an executive
committee composed of 1,800 Vietnamese and only 150 Cambodians.4'
Throughout this period, most Cambodians were kept politically quiet
by the fiction of continued monarchical rule.42 In 1941, King Monivong
died and the Vichy French authorities chose Norodom Sihanouk to be the
new king.43 They passed over Monivong's son, Monireth, because they
believed that the nineteen year-old Sihanouk would be less-experienced
and more pliable.' At the end of World War II, Cambodia experienced
a brief, but exhilarating spell of independence from March to October of
1945, after the Japanese occupation forces had relinquished their power,
and before the return of the French and other Allied forces.45
From 1946 to 1954, Sihanouk was forced to deal with the French
authorities, his own government, and nationalistic rebels. The French gave
Cambodia partial independence, what Sihanouk termed "fifty percent
independence."' The Cambodian government was given administrative
control of most state functions and the indigenous military had autonomy
within Siem Riep and Battambang provinces in the northwest.47 But the
French still controlled foreign policy, the judicial system, finances,
customs, and military operations outside of the autonomous provinces.'
At the same time, Sihanouk was faced with a legislature controlled by the
Democratic Party, a nationalistic party which sought independence imme-
diately and opposed most of the King's legislation.49 Finally, Sihanouk
had to deal with the Khmer Issarak, a rebel military organization com-
40 CHANDA, supra note 17, at 57.
41 Id.
42 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 20. This ploy seems to have worked better in
Cambodia than it did in Vietnam. In Vietnam, the use of protectorates to give the
impression that the emperor still ruled northern and central Vietnam did not seem to
quell revolutionary and nationalistic fervor. Instead, by the 1920s and 1930s, the
Vietnamese monarchy had been discredited and ceased to be a rallying point for
independence movements to eject the French from Vietnam. HUE-TAM Ho TAI,
RADICALIsM AND TiE ORIGINs OF THE VIETNAMEsE REvOLUTION 15-20 (1992).
43 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 21.
44Id.
4 Id. at 22.
16 Id. at 24.
4 Id.
4 Id.
' Id. at 23-26 (discussing Cambodia's path toward independence).
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posed of Cambodian and Vietnamese leftists; anti-monarchical nationalists;
and bandits, who used violent methods to further their goal of indepen-
dence from France."0 Within the Democratic Party there were no doubt
many Khmer Issarak sympathizers.
Sihanouk's response to the pressure from all sides was immensely
successful and is a testament to his political skill. In 1952, he dissolved
the cabinet, suspended the constitution, and assumed control of the
government as Prime Minister. The next year, he suspended the National
Assembly' Throughout this period, Sihanouk exercised direct authoritar-
ian rule, suppressing both the Democratic Party and the Khmer Issarak.
Having taken care of his domestic enemies, he left for France in 1953,
ostensibly for health reasons, but in reality to lobby for Cambodia's
independence. 2 Although he was rebuffed by the French, Sihanouk
remained undeterred and publicized the plight of his country in America,
Canada, and Japan as he headed home. He then declared that he would
not return to Cambodia until France made full assurances that indepen-
dence would be granted to Cambodia. Although he initially resided in
Bangkok, Sihanouk later had to move to the autonomous region of Siem
Riep. This was a risky gamble since the French could have easily re-
placed him with a more pliable successor. But control of Cambodia had
always been incidental to the colonization of Vietnam. It had never been
France's main reason for colonizing Indochina and there were relatively
few reasons for a continued French presence. In 1953, the war effort in
Indochina was going badly for the French and public opinion in metro-
politan France was calling for a withdrawal from Indochina. 3 With little
vested interest in Cambodia and a need to concentrate on Vietnam, the
French agreed to grant independence to Cambodia 4 Sihanouk returned
to Phnom Penh as a hero for having won Cambodia's independence from
France. He had not only defeated the French, but quieted his domestic
opponents as well. Although the opposition at home had painted Sihanouk
as a pro-French puppet and themselves as nationalistic liberators, it was
he who had won Cambodia's independence and the hearts of most of its
citizens.
With elections to be held in 1955, Sihanouk planned his political
victory. He cleverly abdicated the throne to his father so that he could
0 Id. at 23.
51 Id.
52 Id.
13 KARNOW, supra note 29, at 198. For example, the French were badly defeated
by Vietnamese nationalists at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954. Id.
14 CHANDA, supra note 17, at 41
[Vol. 28:395
CAMBODIAN ELECTIONS
devote himself full-time to partisan politics 5 Determined to defeat the
Democratic Party, Sihanouk put together his own party, the Popular
Socialist Community (known by its shortened Khmer name, Sangkum). It
was composed mainly of rightists, but also included the Prince's followers
and several leftists such as Hu Nim; Hou Yuon; and Khieu Samphan, all
of whom later joined the Khmer Rouge.56 Having consolidated the right,
he declared the party's themes to be nationalism, loyalty to the monarchy,
struggle against injustice and corruption, and protection of Buddhist
ideology.' Sangkum gained the support of nationalists, royalists, leftists,
and the religious sector. It won eighty-three percent of the vote and all of
the seats in the National Assembly. 8
Analyses of the period 1955-1970 are at odds. Sihanouk's detractors
paint a picture of repression against the left, especially the Khmer Issarak
and a political intolerance comparable to that of the Khmer Rouge.59
They point to the prevalence of crony socialism, where close friends of
the Prince milked all the profits from state industries for personal use,
likening it to the crony capitalism of the Philippines during the rule of
Ferdinand Marcos.' On the other hand, Sihanouk's supporters emphasize
his visits to isolated villages, where he would receive petitions from
villagers, chat with peasants, pass out and receive gifts, and scold admin-
istrators for mismanagement.6 No doubt, the true picture of the Prince's
administration incorporates aspects of both of these views. However, it
cannot be denied that Sihanouk was and is immensely popular in Cambo-
dia.62
Despite the large right-wing contingent in his party, Sihanouk
followed a centrist political policy, alternating between the right and left.
Even as the war in Vietnam grew, Sihanouk attempted to remain neutral.
However, he believed that the Western influence in Asia would only be
temporary and did not want to provoke the North Vietnamese.63 He
55 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 28; CHANDA, supra note 17, at 41.
36 SEEKiNGS, supra note 10, at 28-29; CHANDA, supra note 17, at 41.
SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 29.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 26.
60 Id. at 30.
61 Id. at 27.
' In a recent poll conducted by an independent management and investment firm,
Sihanouk was found to be the most popular figure in Cambodia. Cambodian Popularity
Poll Ranks King, Singer, REUTERS, June 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiap Library,
Cambod File.
' CHANDA, supra note 17, at 61. Sihanouk believed that North Vietnam would
eventually win the war in Vietnam and that if he aided them, he would "put Commu-
nist Vietnam in Kampuchea's debt in such a way that it would never again dare raise
19961
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
looked the other way as Hanoi used sanctuaries in Cambodia as supply
bases and rest areas for its troops. Sihanouk also ignored the fact that the
Vietnamese Communists were transporting supplies to South Vietnam via
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which snaked southward on the Cambodian side
of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. As a counterweight to Vietnamese
and Thai pressures that had always been exerted on Cambodia, Sihanouk
attempted to befriend China. The two countries signed a treaty of nonag-
gression and worked together to solve the issue of the treatment of
Chinese Cambodians.'
Although Cambodia had received military aid from the United States
in the form of weapons and training in the mid-1950s and early 1960s,
Sihanouk became more suspicious as the Cambodian military forged
closer ties to the United States and moved farther to the right.'
Sihanouk believed that the United States was planning a coup and became
annoyed at U.S. violations of Cambodian airspace as well the intrusion of
South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia in pursuit of the Vietnamese
Communists.' This caused Sihanouk to improve relations with North
Vietnam. He even agreed to negotiate with the National Liberation Front
of South Vietnam (NLFSVN), the umbrella organization of the Vietnam-
ese Communists of South Vietnam, also known as the Viet Cong. In
1969, Cambodia recognized the provisional government of the
NLFSVN.67 At the same time, however, he changed course. In 1967 and
1968, he signaled that he would have no problems with South Vietnamese
troops entering Cambodia in hot pursuit of Viet Cong or airstrikes against
Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia."
Sihanouk's military, which had been hurt by the loss of U.S. military
assistance, had become disgruntled with his erratic neutralist path. In
1970, while Sihanouk was on a trip to Moscow and Beijing, General Lon
Nol, Sihanouk's prime minister, launched a coup d'etat. 9 Most middle-
class, urban, educated citizens were relieved. The National Assembly,
which was controlled by Lon Nol's supporters, voted unanimously to
depose Sihanouk and to give Lon Nol emergency powers." However,
Sihanouk was immensely popular in the countryside and his broadcast
appeals brought about demonstrations and riots throughout the country. At
a hand, so to speak, against our country and our people, its benefactors." Id.
64 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 31-32.
6' Id. at 32.
6 Id. at 33.
67 Id. at 34.
68 Id. at 34-35; CHANDA, supra note 17, at 63-64.
69 CHANDA, supra note 17, at 64
70 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 43.
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one point, 40,000 peasants began to march on Phnom Penh.7 ' Sihanouk
set up a government in exile in Beijing. At the request of the Chinese,
his government in exile associated itself with the Kampuchean Communist
Party (KCP).' While Sihanouk was the face presented to the world, it
was the KCP that did most of the fighting in Cambodia. However, the
KCP had another name, the Khmer Rouge,'3 and they were controlled by
a man named Saloth Sar, whose nom de guerre was Pol Pot.
The irony is that the rightist coup by Lon Nol gave the Khmer
Rouge a second chance. 4 Up to that point, the Communist leaders of
North Vietnam and other countries had shown little real support for the
KCP. Although some training and weapons had been sent to the Cam-
bodian Communists, the Vietnamese generally refrained from doing too
much.:5 After all, as part of his neutralist policy, Sihanouk was fighting
the KCP. The Vietnamese did not want to offend him and risk losing the
use of Cambodian sanctuaries and the Ho Chi Minh trail. With a rightist
government in Phnom Penh, however, Hanoi realized that it would need
a strong KCP to keep the Lon Nol government from disrupting the war
effort in South Vietnam. Otherwise, the Viet Cong would be squeezed
from the west by Lon Nol and from the east by U.S. and South Vietnam-
ese forces. Thus, the North Vietnamese swept out the Cambodian gov-
ernment forces in northeastern Cambodia, handing over this area to the
Khmer Rouge to use as a base.76 In addition, training and military
supply began in earnest. The Khmer Rouge at first used their association
with Sihanouk to gain support among the villagers. Later, when their
power was self-sustaining, they began to denigrate Sihanouk." In his
words of June, 1973, when "they [the Khmer Rouge] no longer need me,
they will spit me out like a cherry pit!"78
On April 17, 1975, the Khmer Rouge defeated the Lon Nol govern-
71 Id.
72 Id. at 43-44.
7 CHANDA, supra note 17, at 41. The term Khmers Rouges refers to two different
groups. It was originally coined by Sihanouk to refer to the Khmer Issarak and his
other leftist opponents. This was in contrast to his opponents on the right, the Khmers
Bleu. Id. But the term also refers to the Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP), the
organization controlled by Pol Pot that ruled Cambodia from 1975-1979. Id.
74 See generally WnIIAm SHAwcRoss, SIDESHOW: KIssiNGER, NIXON AND THE
DESTRUCrION OF CAMBODIA (1979).
' See CHANDA, supra note 17, at 60. For example, Vietnamese Vice-Foreign
Minister Vo Dong Giang, when recounting the history of the 1960s, did not mention
Sihanouk's suppression of the left and noted that Sihanouk was immensely popular. Id.
76 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 45.
77 CHANDA, supra note 17, at 71
7 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 44.
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ment and entered Phnom Penh.79 The United States had long ago re-
moved itself from Indochina and the nationalist government in South
Vietnam was to collapse less than two weeks later." Thus started a
reign of terror in which at least one million Cambodians, of an estimated
population of six to eight million, were murdered. The Khmer Rouge
emptied out all the cities and declared that it was year zero."' Disdaining
technology and the decadence of Western culture, the Khmer Rouge
executed most of the educated class." Even for the non-targeted working
class83 life was miserable. In the agricultural communes where most
Cambodians were forced to live and work, discipline was strict and
punishment was often times grisly. Spying was commonplace."4
The regime cultivated a hatred of the Vietnamese. The anti-Vietnam-
ese sentiment quickly led to escalating attacks on Vietnam by the Khmer
Rouge and retaliatory invasions by Vietnam.' Convinced of the
intractability of the situation by the Khmer Rouge's refusal to negotiate,
on December 24, 1978, Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia.' By
January 7, 1979, the Vietnamese had used their advantage in numbers,
training, and weapons to defeat the Khmer Rouge and enter Phnom
Penh." The Vietnamese set up a Cambodian government composed of
ex-Khmer Rouge who had defected because of Pol Pot's brutality and
pro-Vietnamese Cambodian Communists who had stayed in Vietnam when
the Khmer Rouge took over.8" The new administration was not strong
79 NGUYEN-VO, supra note 19, at 78.
w Id.
81 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 48-49.
82 Id. at 50.
83 The Khmer Rouge classified people as "new people" (urban dwellers) or "old
people" (rural peasants). For "new people," life was often a living hell. They were
treated as slave laborers, working the longest hours in the most inhospitable places for
the smallest rice rations. SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 53. The life for "old people" was
harsh, but not as bad as for "new people." Id. In some areas, especially under more
moderate commanders along the Vietnamese border, "new people" who were penitent
lead the same life as "old people." Id. at 53-54. This ended in 1977 when Pol Pot had
many Eastern cadres purged for being traitors (i.e. being more moderate) and the re-
maining moderate cadres fled to Vietnam. Id. at 65-66.
84 Id. at 50-51.
s' For a detailed description of the pre-war border attacks, some of which were
quite large in scale, see NGUYEN-VO, supra note 19, at 96-102, 104.
'6 Id. at 126.
" CHANDA, supra note 17, at 316-17
88 SEEKINGS, supra note 10, at 193. Ex-Khmer Rouge members in the new
government included Heng Samrin, Hun Sen, and Chea Sim. Id; see also RINN-SUP
SHIN, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN CAMBODIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 193 (Russell R.
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enough to stand on its own so there was significant Vietnamese economic
and military support."
Meanwhile, several rebel groups formed on the Thai-Cambodian
border. Each vied for control of the numerous refugee camps that had
sprung up as Cambodian villagers fled or were forced to flee the fighting.
The rebel groups fought the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese-installed Cambo-
dian government, and themselves. The three groups were the Khmer
Rouge, backed by China and Thailand; the National United Front for An
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (known by its
French acronym FUNCINPEC), the royalist movement headed by Prince
Sihanouk and backed by China ad the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN); and the Kampuchean People's National Liberation
Front (KPNLF), a rightist group lead by Son Sann and backed by the
United States.' At the urging of China and ASEAN, they formed a
loose and uneasy alliance known as the Coalition Government of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in order to fight the Vietnamese.' Sihanouk
was its nominal leader.9 The fighting continued throughout the 1980s.
Although the Vietnamese and their Cambodian allies, the State of Cambo-
dia (SOC), were never able to defeat the rebel forces, they did deal a
crippling blow in the dry season offensive of 1984-1985.' 3 This gave the
SOC sufficient breathing room to form a working, stable government. By
the late-1980s, life in Cambodia had achieved some semblance of nor-
malcy, much like life in the pre-war and pre-Lon Nol era some twenty
years before.94 Under general principles of international law on state-
hood, the SOC should have been the de jure government of Cambodia.95
Nonetheless, lobbying by the United States, China, and ASEAN guaran-
teed that the CGDK, with the Khmer Rouge as its representative, retained
Cambodia's seat in the U.N. General Assembly.'
Ross ed., 3d ed. 1990).
' CHANDA, supra note 17, at 371-72. The most prominent Vietnamese personnel in
Cambodia were the approximately 180,000 Vietnamese troops who stayed in Cambodia
throughout the 1980s. NGUYEN-VO, supra note 19, at 145.
' SHiN, supra note 88, at 194-95.
9' Id. at 195-201.
92 Id. at 202-03.
93 JONATHAN STROMSETH, TIME ON WHOSE SIDE IN CAMBODIA? 6 (1988).
' For example, Phnom Penh's population had grown to 500,00 and rice production
was up to 2.5 million tons per year, approaching the output for the late 1960s.
VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION, supra note 35, at 88-89.
9' See id. at 85-102.
' Id. at 8-9; SHIN, supra note 88, at 223. In 1979, the vote in the U.N. General
Assembly calling for an unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese troops was 91 to 21,
with 29 abstaining. SHIN, supra note 88, at 223. The situation was little changed in
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This situation changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
concomitant cessation of Soviet aid to Vietnam. The Vietnamese had been
economically and politically isolated as a result of their invasion and
occupation of Cambodia. They were largely dependent on approximately
$1 billion per year of Soviet aid.' When the Soviet Union collapsed, the
Vietnamese were forced to reassess the situation. The Cambodian conflict
as well as a punitive invasion by China in 1979 and mismanagement of
the economy had put Vietnam in terrible economic condition.98 Forced
to deal with the reality of the change in the world geopolitical order, they
gradually withdrew their armed forces from Cambodia. The last withdraw-
als were completed in 1989.9 To the surprise of many, the Vietnamese-
installed SOC did not collapse and fought effectively against the rebels.
Apparently, the decade of Vietnamese support had given them the time to
create a functioning government.
The stalemate eventually led to efforts to resolve the conflict peace-
fully. On October, 24, 1991, the rebels and the government, under
pressure from their various sponsors, agreed to a cease-fire, a demobiliza-
tion of their forces, and free and fair elections to be run by the United
Nations." The first U.N. personnel began arriving the next month.
Eventually, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), as the mission was called, consisted of 22,000 soldiers and
civil administrators."10 It is estimated that the mission cost between $1.5
to $2.0 billion, and another $880 million was pledged in economic aid."°
1988, when 122 nations voted in favor of the resolution and 19 voted against, with
thirteen abstentions. VmITNAM'S INTERVENTION, supra note 35, at 9. It should be noted
however, that the United Nations's view of the Khmer Rouge did slowly change as the
evidence of its genocidal atrocities emerged. By 1988, resolutions were drafted calling
for "the non-return of the universally condemned policies and practices of a recent
past . .. ." VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION, supra note 35, at 9.
' For a more detailed analysis, see VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION, supra note 35, at
125-28.
For example, rice production fell from 18.5 million tons to 17.6 million tons,
unemployment was at 30%, and Vietnam faced $7 billion in debt. Id. at 125.
"' See William Branigin, Defections Weakening Ranks of Cambodian Rebels, WASH.
POST, Sept. 25, 1993, at A15. Even the U.S. Defense Department acknowledged that
Vietnam had completely withdrawn by October, 1989. See also GARY KLINTWORTH,
CAMBODIA AND PEACEKEEPING 2 (1990).
"oo See Andrew Bell & Nick Cumming-Bruce, France: Historic Deal to End War in
Cambodia, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 1991, at 12, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Txtine File.
101 See William Branigin, U.N. Ends Cabodian Operation; Mission Successful Despite
Flaws, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1993, at A12.
"0 See William Branigin, Cambodia Moves to Return Sihanouk to His Throne;
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The mission, however, was not a complete success. The Khmer
Rouge refused to lay down their weapons and their troops did not show
up for cantonment. They also refused to participate in the elections and
actively attempted to sabotage them. Despite this fact, the elections
themselves were a success. From May 23-28, 1993, the United Nations
administered elections that were widely considered free and fair."r The
turnout was high, more than four million people or 89.04% of the regis-
tered voters."° FUNCINPEC, Prince Sihanouk's royalist party, won a
plurality of the seats, 58 out 120 (45.47% or 1.8 million votes). The
Cambodian People's Party (CPP, the party of the SOC) came in second
with 51 seats (38.22% or 1.53 million votes)." Son Sann's Buddhist
Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) came in third with 10 seats (3.8% or
152,764 votes) and Molinaka, a royalist splinter party, received the
remaining vote."° Although the SOC at first refused to abide by the
results of the elections, the three major victorious parties eventually
reached a compromise power-sharing agreement. Prince Ranaridh, head of
the royalist party and a son of Prince Sihanouk, became the First Prime
Minister while Hun Sen, head of the CPP, became Second Prime Minis-
ter." Son Sann was elected Speaker of the Assembly. l"' The royalists
Elected Leaders Said to Form Consensus on Monarchy, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1993,
at A18; U.N. Confirms Dates for Cambodia Pullout, L.A. TIMEs Aug. 28, 1993, at
All
'" The financial situation of the mission is unclear. Commentators have estimated
that the mission could eventually cost between $1.5-$2.0 billion, but it is unlikely that
a comprehensive and accurate accounting will be done anytime soon. Aid Is Out If
Khmer Rouge Is In, U.S. Tells Cambodia, WASH. POST, July 19, 1993, at A9; Cambo-
dia: Thailand 'Recognises' UNTAC's Poll Results, BANGKOK POST, June 12, 1993.
Andrew Peacock, an election observer and Liberal Party member of the Australian
Parliament, expressed satisfaction that the poll "was as fair as it could have been under
the circumstances." Eric Ellis, Cambodia's Close Call Raises New Khmer Rouge Fears,
AusTL. FIN. REv., May 31, 1993. It is unclear why the Khmer Rouge did not actively
disrupt the elections, which they could have done. One theory is that they did not want
to alienate the vast majority of Cambodians, including some of their own supporters,
who wanted to vote. Alternatively, they may have not wanted to instigate full-scale
violence against U.N. peacekeepers monitoring the polling stations. Finally, there are
reports that the Chinese urged them not to disrupt the elections. Mark Baker, Khmer
Rouge Feted for Role in Peace, THE AGE (Melbourne), May 27, 1993, at 18.
'4 Lindsay Murdoch, The Ultimate Bad Loser-Hun Sen, THE AGE (Melbourne), June
12, 1993 available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File; U.N. Says Elections Were
"Free and Fair," AGENCE EUROPE, June 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Txtlne file.
'o5 See Cambodia Still in the Pits, Bus. TIMES (Malaysia), June 18, 1993, at 4.
106 Id.
"o See Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia: New Deal on Cambodian P.M., THE AGE
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and the CPP .agreed to share power over the important interior and
defense ministries."°9 The elected representatives drafted a new constitu-
tion, which was ratified on September 25, 1993, and then convened itself
as the National Assembly."' In an interesting twist, the monarchy was
reinstituted with Sihanouk as king. The National Assembly decided to
"Once again vest... Sihanouk with the full and special powers inherent
in his capacity and duties as head of state in order that he may save our
nation and lead it on the path towards peace and prosperity."'
Sihanouk was given veto powers over judicial and cabinet appointments
and military decisions."' Sihanouk then declared that henceforth Cambo-
dia would "be a de facto liberal democracy with a parliamentary re-
gine.
, ,M
3
The United Nations personnel started leaving on August 2, 1993 1"
and the last members of the mission left on November 15, 1993."'
Recognizing the success of the elections, the Khmer Rouge attempted in
July and August, 1993, to negotiate a role for themselves in the new
government. To this end, they commenced a campaign of attacks through-
out the country, but were repulsed by the government."6 Although the
government at first considered a role for the Khmer Rouge, it eventually
refused to negotiate until the Khmer Rouge surrendered themselves and
(Melbourne), Sept. 18, 1993., at 9.
" Philip Shenon, Rival Parties In Cambodia Agree to From a Coalition Govern-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1993, at A10.
" Cambodian Agreement, WASH. POST, June 21, 1993, at A13. In addition,
FUNCINPEC would take over the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance while the
CPP retained control of the Ministry of Information. Id.
... Sihanouk Again Becomes King and Picks Government, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1993, at A3.
. Philip Shenon, New Assembly Gives Prince Sihanouk Broad Powers, N.Y TIMES,
June 15, 1993, at A3; William Branigin, Sihanouk Proclaimed New Head of State;
Assembly Gives Cambodia 'Special Powers,' WASH. POST, June 15, 1993, at A16.
..2 See Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia: Sihanouk Cancer News Shakes Cambodian
Plan, THF AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 21, 1993, at 9. In fact, Sihanouk is the supreme
military commander in Cambodia. Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia Puts Final Touches on
New Regime, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 16, 1993.
113 Khmers to Share Interim Power, BANGKOK POST, June 17, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Textine File.
..4 See Cambodia: Peacekeeping Troops Have Started Their Withdrawal and Now
Cambodia Is Pondering Its Future, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 10, 1993, at 3; U.N.
Confirms Dates for Cambodia Pullout, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1993, at All.
See Military Troops to End U.N. Mission in Cambodia, JAPAN ECON. NEwSwnE,
Nov. 15, 1993., available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
116 See UNTAC Pulls Out While Khmer Rouge Attacks Become Routine, VT. INV.
REv., Aug. 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
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their territory." 7
Since that time, the newly created Royal Government of Cambodia
(RGC) has gone about the business of attempting to rebuild Cambodia.
Although it has been unable to destroy the Khmer Rouge, it has regis-
tered successes in many fields."' For their part, the Khmer Rouge have
continued their campaign of attacks against ethnic Vietnamese and
government personnel, but have been unable to negotiate a role for
themselves in the new government. The Khmer Rouge currently have
about 12,000 fighters and control fifteen percent of Cambodia's territory,
although there is widespread agreement that it is not capable of toppling
the new government. '19 The new, unified Khmer Royal Army (KRA)
has about 90,000 men."
"' "Prince Ranaridh declared today that the Khmer Rouge, the ultra-Maoist faction
that boycotted the elections, would be given no political power in the Government and
rejected the group's latest request for a 15% share of control over ministries." Lindsay
Murdoch, Cambodia's Rulers Heal Rift Over Power, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 17,
1993, at 8, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File. Later, Prince Ranaridh
stated, "The position of the Royal Government of Cambodia in this regard [negotiating
a role for the Khmer Rouge] is perfectly clear. We are ready to welcome the Khmer
Rouge group within the Royal Army and the Royal Government of Cambodia as
advisers. But we demand, in return, that the Khmer Rouge group assumes the same
responsibilities of the three other former parties which signed the Paris agreements."
Fauziah Ismail, Cambodia Seeks Help In Maintaining Peace, Bus. TIMEs (Malaysia),
Oct. 6, 1993, at 18 available in LEXIS, Asiapo Library, Cambod File. However, the
Khmer Rouge have refused to lay down their arms and cede their territory to the new
government as required. In response, the government passed a bill outlawing the Khmer
Rouge. National Assembly Adopts Bill Outlawing Khmer Rouge, REUTERS, July 11,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File. Not everyone agreed with this
move however. Foreign Minister Norodom Sirivudh, Sihanouk's half-brother has "never
thought a military option would settle the problem of the Khmer Rouge. The govern-
ment'has just decided to outlaw it; the big door has already been closed." He felt that
a passage should be left for the Khmer Rouge. "It is not a question of forgiving the
genocide, but one cannot carry out a policy of vengeance. A government has the right
of self-defense, but the Cambodian people prefer having more hospitals, schools and
roads than settling their conflicts." Interview with Prince Norodom Sirivudh, Foreign
Minister of Cambodia, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (July 10, 1994).
,,. See infra text accompanying notes 219-47.
,," See James Pringle, Corrupt Army Boosts Image of Khmer Rouge, THE TIMES
(London), Aug. 25, 1994 available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File; Pol Pot's
Men Win the Battle of Fear, ECONOMIST, May 7, 1994, at 36.
' See Mark Dodd, Cambodian Army Forms Elite Guard Unit, REUTERS, Oct. 16,
1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
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1H. THE LEGITIMACY-BASED BENEFrrs OF THE ELECTIONS IN
CAMBODIA
A. Introduction
The recent elections will have many and varied effects on the people
and country of Cambodia in the years to come. Some of these effects
will not emerge or be identifiable for many years. For example, few
academics would be willing to herald the formation of a stable democracy
before a score of years has passed since these first elections. However,
this Article will analyze three specific products of the elections that are
not directly related to the creation of a stable democratic system of
government. As such, one can already recognize the existence of these
benefits even at this early stage.
Each of these benefits is rooted in the legitimation function of
elections. First, those who refuse to participate in free and fair elections
and who publicly declare that they will hinder the elections will lose po-
litical legitimacy. The Khmer Rouge's boycott of the elections not only
resulted in their lack of representation in the newly formed government
(i.e., loss of political power), but it also caused them to lose domestic
and international support (i.e., loss of political legitimacy). This, in turn,
decreased their military and economic strength.
Second, those parties that were legitimized by their participation in
the elections came together to form a legitimate and functioning govern-
ment. The CGDK was a shaky alliance at best. Its adversary, the SOC,
lacked domestic and international legitimacy. By contrast, the new coali-
tion government of Cambodia, the RGC, is not only more stable, but also
offers more political and economic hope for Cambodia's future. The new
government is the first Cambodian government in over two decades to
possess both political legitimacy (i.e., the right to govern) and political
power (i.e., the ability to govern). The members of the new government
thus have all the more reason to protect their new, hard-won advantage.
Finally, the elections have conferred political power on Norodom
Sihanouk. This is not surprising considering that Sihanouk possesses more
political legitimacy than any other individual in Cambodia. However, for
the past two decades, his actual economic, political, and military power
has been minor or negligible. Even the Arnee National Sihanoukiste
(ANS), the military component of FUNCINPEC, has been overshadowed
by the armies of the Khmer Rouge and the SOC. But Prince Sihanouk's
royalist party won a plurality of the votes in the recent elections and he
has been reinstalled as the king in a constitutional monarchy. Although it
is unclear exactly how much power he will wield as king, his party's
plurality in the legislature, his son's position as First Prime Minister, and
his skill at politics, make it likely that Sihanouk will have a significant
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role in shaping Cambodia's future. Sihanouk's ascension will bring about
the stability much needed for prosperity and eventual democracy, for he
is the one individual that most Cambodians and their leaders are willing
to obey.
This section of the Article will analyze each of these beneficial
products of the elections in four parts. First, it will determine the validity
of the premise underlying each electoral benefit. To show that the elec-
tions brought a benefit, it is necessary to prove that a prior situation
existed which was worse than the current situation. Second, the Article
will determine if the current situation is in fact different from the old
situation. Third, it will look at the consequences of each electoral benefit
to determine if they were in fact beneficial. Finally, the Article will ana-
lyze the causal link between the elections and the benefits, focusing on
whether the benefits could have come about without the elections. The
next section of this Article will discuss the implications of the Cambodian
elections by placing them within the larger context of general theories of
democracy formation.
B. The Khmer Rouge's Error
1. Introduction
The Khmer Rouge injured themselves when they refused to partici-
pate in the elections. 2 ' They were hurt in two ways. First, they lost
political legitimacy at home by revealing their underconfidence and by
proving themselves to be a roadblock to peace. Just as important, howev-
er, they lost what little political legitimacy they had abroad. Specifically,
the Khmer Rouge's actions gave China, a long-time ally and supplier of
aid, a face-saving way to distance itself from its notorious client. In
addition, the elections created international pressure on the Thais to stop
aid and trade with the Khmer Rouge.
2. The Premise
Of course, in order to argue that the Khmer Rouge lost political
legitimacy as a result of their boycott and sabotage of the elections, one
must first show that such political legitimacy existed in the first place. At
first glance, one would guess that the Khmer Rouge are wildly unpopular.
It is undisputed that they caused immense hardship for their own people
and that their actions shocked the conscience of the world community.
However, the level of popular support for them is much disputed. In fact,
"2 The question of why the Khmer Rouge would agree to have elections in the first
place is an interesting one. They had little to gain since many Cambodians suffered
under their rule.
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an inquiry into the level of political legitimacy the Khmer Rouge enjoyed
before the elections reveals a surprising answer. "
Within Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge were not as unpopular as one
might initially suspect. First, memories of the Khmer Rouge's reign are
not as strong as one would imagine. In 1990, 34.9% of the population
was under fourteen years of age," meaning that over one-third of all
Cambodians were roughly four years old or younger the last time the
Khmer Rouge were in power. In such a young country, memories may
indeed be short. For example, a large portion of Khmer Rouge military
recruits are quite young, eighty percent of them having been recruited
after 1979.124 Even among those Cambodians old enough to remember,
it was urban professionals and other skilled persons who bore the brunt
of the wrath of the Khmer Rouge. Not everyone in Cambodia faced the
"Killing Fields." It is, therefore, likely that the reign of the Khmer Rouge
did not cause a loss of support among the traditional supporters of the
Khmer Rouge, the poorest peasants. The life of average Cambodian
farmers today is far from easy. To them, distant memories of life under
the Khmer Rouge might not seem so harsh.
Second, the Khmer Rouge have instituted a new campaign to win the
hearts and minds of Cambodian citizens. Although there are reports that
much of the work and recruiting done by the Khmer Rouge is at gun
point, Khmer Rouge cadres in many areas have been kind, thoughtful,
and helpful to civilians."2 In addition, the Khmer Rouge publicly an-
nounced in 1979 that Pol Pot would be stepping down from his leader-
ship role and that the Khmer Rouge would be represented by more
moderate leaders such as Khieu Samphan.' Although there is agree-
ment that this is a cosmetic change and that Pol Pot retains power, the
Khmer Rouge have no doubt benefited by distancing themselves from
names that evoke memories of bad times in Cambodia. Further, the
Khmer Rouge have been apologetic about their rule, attempting to gain
forgiveness. Khieu Samphan has admitted that the Khmer Rouge tried to
develop the country "much too fast" and that this had "affected the health
" Perhaps one of the reasons that the Khmer Rouge did in fact agree to the
elections was that they ascertained a certain amount of popular support upon which
they felt they could build.
2 Country: Cambodia, KCWD/Kaleidoscope, Feb. 20, 1995, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Cambod File. Given that Cambodia's population growth rate is
projected at 2.5% per year and that 34.5% of the population was 14 or under in 1987,
see SHuN, supra note 88, at 308. The percentage is no doubt higher today. Id.
124 See, e.g., KLnWORTH, supra note 99, at 6.
125 Id.
"2 SHIN, supra note 88, at 194.
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of the people," leading to approximately one million deaths.'" Finally,
the Khmer Rouge have announced a liberalization in their policies. They
have expressed support for the new constitution, which guarantees eco-
nomic freedom, political freedom, and human rights." They now say
they are in favor of a capitalist economy and a parliamentary political
system.'29 Although it is implausible that the Khmer Rouge are telling
the truth, they have improved their image to the extent that their detrac-
tors cannot conclusively prove that their policies are to the contrary and
to the extent that their friends have some arguments to defend their
support of the Khmer Rouge."
Finally, the Khmer Rouge have gained popularity by whipping up
anti-Vietnamese sentiment. The Khmer Rouge were responsible for a
program of terror in which thirty-three Vietnamese were killed in March,
1993, causing thousands of Vietnamese to flee in the ensuing months.'
In April another 100 or so Vietnamese were killed by the Khmer
Rouge.'32 Even as late as July, after the elections, eleven Vietnamese
were killed by Khmer Rouge attacks."' Although it was the Vietnamese
who liberated the Cambodians from the terrors of Pol Pot, many Cambo-
dians are unable to overcome their deep-seated fear and suspicion that
Vietnam's ultimate goal is to annex Cambodia proper and populate it
with ethnic Vietnamese. Older Cambodians base their fears on past
historical experience and, given that history, the fear is not altogether
irrational. Younger Cambodians can point to the fact that Vietnamese
troops stayed in Cambodia for almost a decade and that Vietnamese
settlers streamed into Cambodia after the Vietnamese invasion."
'2 Id. at 198.
"s Rebels Back Cambodia King, Despite Reports of Fighting, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 2,
1993, at A3 [hereinafter Rebels].
'9 SHIN, supra note 88, at 198; STROMSETH, supra note 93, at 13.
'3 These actions are hardly unexpected. It is common for revolutionary parties which
have not achieved power to attempt to win the hearts and minds of the populace. The
Khmer Rouge enacted a similar campaign before they came to power in 1975. See
RUSSELL R. Ross & ANDREO MoTLEs SOVODO, INTRODUCTION TO FEDERAL RESEARCH
DIVIsION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CAMBODIA: A CoUNTRY STUDY XXXi (Rusell R.
Ross ed., 3d ed. 1990)
,', See Ben Kiernan, Let Cambodians Have Justice at Last, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
1993, at A28.
32 See Khmer Rouge Warns U.N. Over 'Illegal' Elections, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
May 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File [hereinafter Khmer Rouge
Warns].
" See U.N. to Launch Aid Programme for Ethnic Vietnamese Stranded at Vietnam-
Cambodia Border, VmTNAM INV. REV., Aug. 16, 1993 available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Cambod File.
,34 Some of the ethnic Vietnamese had lived in Cambodia for generations and had
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The Khmer Rouge campaign apparently hit such a responsive chord
with the Cambodian people that the three other factions, including the
Vietnamese-installed SOC, echoed the anti-Vietnamese sentiment. The
RGC has taken the same stance. It refuses to allow many Cambodians of
Vietnamese ethnicity to return from Vietnam where they fled after Khmer
Rouge terror in March, 19932" First Prime Minister Prince Ranaridh
made a statement in late August, 1993 that he felt the presence of ethnic
Vietnamese caused serious difficulties for the new government. 6 The
RGC stated that it could not guarantee the safety of those returning home,
necessitating a U.N. program to help the refugees. 7 Given this atmo-
sphere in Cambodia, it is not surprising that the Khmer Rouge, who were
among the first and most anti-Vietnamese, would be given the most
credit.
Within the international arena, the situation was clearer. Although the
Khmer Rouge were widely reviled for their brutal activities, it is undis-
puted that they received aid from abroad.' Both the Chinese and Thai
governments, although embarrassed by mention of their association, are
widely acknowledged as having sent aid to the Khmer Rouge. 9 In fact,
Thais were an important conduit of Chinese supplies in addition to being
fled Cambodia only when the Khmer Rouge began persecuting the Vietnamese. Many
of these persons were merely returning to their homes. Others were sent by the
Vietnamese government as punishment or with incentives. Finally, some came for the
economic opportunities. The cease-fire, the presence of large numbers of United Nations
personnel, and the revitalization of the Cambodian economy made Cambodia more
attractive than economically stagnant Vietnam. The figures for total Vietnamese
immigration are disputed. The CGDK claimed that in 1989 there were over 1.2 million
Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia. NGUYEN-VO, supra note 19, at 146. The SOC claimed
that there were only 80,000. East bloc diplomats in Cambodia estimated a number in
between; 400.000 to 450,000. Id.
,35 See Upholding Human Rights After UNTAC, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 17, 1993, at
2.
" Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia Faces New Hostilities, THE AGE (Melbourne), Aug.
30, 1993, at 8.
'37 See U.N. to Launch Aid Programme for Ethnic Vietnamese Stranded at Vietnam-
Cambodia Border, VIETNAM INv. REv., Aug. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library,, Txtlne File.
,31 It is not necessary to argue that the Khmer Rouge possessed political legitimacy
within the international arena, which they clearly did not. Rather, the emphasis is on
proving that they were receiving substantial amounts of aid from international patrons,
such aid being cut off in the wake of the elections.
131 See, e.g., William Branigin, Violence Continues in Cambodia: Khmer Rouge
Leaves Villagers in Fear, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1991, at A41; Sutin Wanabovorn,
Khmer Rouge Commander Says Goal is Not Military Victory, REtrERS, Oct. 6, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
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a supplier of arms in their own right." Support came in other forms as
well, sometimes from surprising sources. For example, after the Viet-
namese had ousted the Khmer Rouge, the United States, China, and
ASEAN lobbied for the CGDK to retain Cambodia's seat in the U.N.
General Assembly. However, all were abundantly aware that by common
agreement of the members of the CGDK, the Khmer Rouge would
represent the CGDK at the United Nations.'
3. The Weakening of the Khmer Rouge
a. Domestic Legitimacy
The Khmer Rouge have lost much of their political legitimacy. Not
only did they forego an opportunity to win a place in the new gov-
ernment, they also managed to alienate many citizens with their actions.
The elections were a huge success. Ninety-eight percent of the citizens
eligible to vote were registered and almost ninety percent of those people
voted. This high turnout in the face of exhortations to boycott and threats
of attack showed the weakness of the Khmer Rouge.
Within the group of people whom the Khmer Rouge did not directly
control, it was apparent that their message was ignored. One reporter
recounted the story of a lone voting outpost in Khmer Rouge territory.
Five hundred and nine voters reached the mobile polling station beyond
the village of Angkor Thorn last Tuesday, interrupted only by the twice-
daily shelling by the Khmer Rouge, at breakfast and lunch. Mortars
landed within a few hundred yards of the Bangladeshi Untac battalion
guarding the site. The next day 100 more had voted by lunchtime,
straggling in from villages to the north where it is too dangerous to
establish polling booths.42
Even more telling was the fact that people living under Khmer
Rouge control were not deterred from voting. Many Khmer Rouge cadres
and their families disobeyed directives from the party leadership and cast
their ballots. For example, Khmer Rouge civilians were seen voting in the
town of Poipet in Banteay Meanchey province. 43 A U.N. election offi-
cial told the story of how Khmer Rouge cadres in another area allowed
villagers to vote.
'40 See Protest Planned Over UNTAC Allegation, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 7, 1993.
141 Id.
" Nick Thorpe, Royalists Take Early Lead in Cambodia Poll, OBSERVER, May 30,
1993.
,43 Government Party Likely to Win 3 Seats in Poipet By Apichart, BANGKOK POST,
May 29, 1993.
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Catherine Pascal is [sic] Untac electoral supervisor in the remote
Banteay Srei district. Just before the election, she received a regular
visitor from a Khmer Rouge-controlled village. Villagers had been given
permission by the guerrilla commander to vote. The commander had ad-
vised them to vote for Funcinpec, but warned Pascal that once they had
voted, an attack would be launched on government soldiers next to the
polling site. All 220 registered voters from the village arrived in two
groups, on Sunday and Monday. On Wednesday the guerrillas attacked,
and were beaten back. But in the one hour the polling station was open
between shelling and machine-gun attacks, 24 people from another
village voted.'"
Pat Pring, a Khmer Rouge company commander in Kompot Thom, stated
that his unit had been ordered to shell polling sites to prevent voting. "In
some places we did, and some places we didn't," he said. The orders
were disobeyed, he said, when unit members feared harming their rela-
tives who wanted to vote.45 Sy Ninh, another Khmer Rouge guerrilla
commander, was also ordered to disrupt the elections. "We were given
the order, but we didn't do it," he said at a Cambodian military camp
sixteen miles southeast of Phnom Penh. "It was the people's election.
They want peace in the country."'" There was even internal confusion.
The Khmer Rouge radio stated that few Cambodians chose to vote in the
elections, 47 despite the fact that its own cadres had defied orders not to
vote and widespread agreement that the turnout had been high. As one
observer noted "The guerrilla faction [the Khmer Rouge] have been
effectively ostracised - largely by its own decision to boycott the
polls . . .,.
Second, the Khmer Rouge's refusal to participate was seen as a sign
of underconfidence in their own popularity. Although their refusal may
have actually been based on an honest belief that the United Nations
would not hold fair elections or that the Vietnamese had not really pulled
out, the populace saw a refusal to participate as weakness. The Khmer
Rouge argued that the elections would not be free and fair, were meant
only to entrench the SOC in power, and that the SOC would not relin-
quish power.49 However, the SOC's party did not win and it nonethe-
'44 Id.
'4' Branigin, supra note 101.
146 Id.
'4' Ellis, supra note 103.
'4' Ethan Casey, A Summary of One Long Month of Suspense in Cambodia,
BANGKOK POST, June 29, 1993.
149 Id.
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less agreed to share power with FUNCINPEC and the BLDP. "Our
leaders told us there are still Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and that the
[Vietnamese-installed] Phnom Penh government would not give power to
Prince Ranaridh," said Pring. "But when I got here, I could see it was
not true."' 0 It is no surprise then that "[d]iplomats and U.N. analysts
believe the Khmer Rouge's credibility among Cambodians in rural
provinces is diminishing."''
b. International Support
i. China
In the international arena, the Khmer Rouge enjoyed little popularity
thanks to concerted efforts by the SOC and the Vietnamese government
to expose the atrocities of the "Killing Fields." But the Khmer Rouge did
have two major suppliers of arms and aid - China and Thailand. How-
ever, China's many reasons for supporting the Khmer Rouge began to
disappear. By the late 1980s, Southeast Asia was no longer a proxy for
the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Soviet Union had ceased to exist. Although
China was still concerned about its security interests vis A vis Vietnam,
with the cessation of Soviet aid, the Vietnamese did not pose as grave a
threat as they had during the 1980s. The lack of Soviet aid was especial-
ly painful to the Vietnamese when coupled with international economic
sanctions and domestic economic mismanagement. Tiring of their com-
mitment to the SOC, the Vietnamese agreed to puli their troops out of
Cambodia. It is now widely acknowledged that the Vietnamese did in fact
withdraw all of their troops from Cambodia in 1989.12 Although the
Khmer Rouge and China initially did not give any credence to Vietnam's
announcement of a withdrawal, they have subsequently split on this issue.
While the Khmer Rouge called a January, 5, 1989, Vietnamese withdraw-
al announcement "a deceitful trick," the Chinese called it "a positive
step."'' In fact, the Vietnamese have improved relations with China in
,5 Branigin, supra note 101. Pring's views are supported by almost all the members
of the United Nations. For example, the foreign ministers of ASEAN (Brunei, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore) made a joint statement that
those countries believed the elections to be free and fair. ASEAN Affirms Its Support
for Prince Sihanouk, BANGKOK POST, June 18, 1993."
"' Lindsay Murdoch, Rebel Gives Up the Khmer Rouge Fight, THE AGE (Mel-
bourne), Sept. 17, 1993, at 8 [hereinafter Murdoch, Rebel Gives Up]
"' KLINTWORTH, supra note 99, at 2-3. The United Nations probably does not fear
that the elections were improperly influenced by a third country because it has
accepted the results of the recent elections in countries such as Vietnam.
'53 Id. at 17, n.59.
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search of new sources of aid and trade. In November, 1991, Vietnamese
Communist Party Secretary Do Muoi and Premier Vo Van Kiet were
given a warm reception on a state visit to China.5 4 In return, Chinese
Premier Li Peng visited Vietnam in early December, 1992.' Acknowl-
edging that the Vietnamese no longer exert an undue influence in Cambo-
dia, the Chinese have publicly stated that they will abide by the terms of
the cease-fire and elections agreement." 6
At the same time, there emerged reasons for China to stop sending
aid to the Khmer Rouge. The events at Tiananmen Square in 1989
severely hampered China's standing in the international community. At a
time when it was attempting to make friends abroad and become a
regional superpower, its association with the Khmer Rouge marred its
reputation. Further, China began looking inward, stressing its domestic
economic development.5 7 And in the past, China had proven its ability
to let pragmatic considerations drive its international affairs. For example,
China attempted to curb human rights abuses in the months before
Beijing presented its bid to host the summer Olympics.' Thus, there
was every reason to believe that China would stop supporting the Khmer
Rouge.
For political reasons however, China could not just drop a client that
it had supported since the early 1970s. That would undermine its other
allies' confidence and would cripple China's ability to make new friends,
always a necessary condition to becoming a superpower. One scholar has
noted that "Beijing cannot tolerate being seen to lose the war by having
its Khmer Rouge clients excluded [from a new government], at least not
"' See Charles P. Wallace, The Giant Awakens, Vietnam, L.A. Tnmm, June 15,
1993, at 10.
'5' China Lauds Premier's Visit To Vietnam, REuiERs, Dec. 5, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
156 China Backs Disarmament of Cambodian Factions, REUTERS, July 13, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File. For example, Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen stated that "China supports the second phase of the cease-fire [the disarmament
and demobilization of the factions] in Cambodia and its implementation [as] an
important step in ensuring the realisation of true peace." Id.
'" "Implicit in China's reluctance to carry out a 'second lesson' [the 'first lesson'
being its invasion of Vietnam in February, 1980 in retaliation for Vietnam's invasion
of Cambodia the December before] is an admission that its commitment to economic
reform at home outweighs its willingness to exert enough muscle against Vietnam to
turn the tide of the war in Cambodia." STROMSETH, supra note 93, at 21.
,58 Catherine Field, Silenced Again, GAzErr (Montreal), Sept. 26, 1994, at B3.
China's pragmatism is such that its human rights abuses began almost as soon as its
bid to host the Olympic games was turned down. Id.
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at this state."' Further, any move by China would prove that politically
and philosophically, Beijing had never actually believed in the Khmer
Rouge's cause, but had only supported them for reasons of political
expediency. Either the Chinese leadership would have to admit that they
had allowed the genocide in Cambodia to occur because it was conve-
nient to do so, or that their political theories had been wrong.
The question, then, is whether China did in fact use the escape hatch
offered to it. It is clear that the Chinese have at least withdrawn their
public support for the Khmer Rouge. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen stated that although China had given aid to a faction in the past,
that "did not mean that [China] supported the practices of that fac-
tion.'' "W Another Chinese Foreign Ministry official echoed the sentiment,
"The Chinese government... solemnly condemns acts jeopardising the
safety of United Nations peacekeeping forces," when asked about Khmer
Rouge attacks on U.N. peacekeepers.' At a recent Chinese reception
for Sihanouk in Beijing, the Chinese made another swipe at the Khmer
Rouge. Referring to recent Khmer Rouge assaults on returning Cambodian
refugees, ethnic Vietnamese, and U.N. peacekeeping troops, National
People's Congress Chairman Qiao Shi stated, "We do not support any
party in Cambodia to fight a civil war. We do not endorse any...
practices that lead to confrontation and aggravating contradictions.""
Finally, Wu Jiannin, the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said
before the elections that if the civil war was renewed in Cambodia, China
would no longer support the Khmer Rouge." Thus, there is little doubt
that China has withdrawn its public support for the Khmer Rouge.
It is also generally agreed that the Chinese have stopped sending
supplies to their former clients. Since the signing of the cease-fire and
,.. KLINrWORTH, supra note 99, at 11.
" A New Chance for the Khmer Rouge, THE AGE (Melbourne), July 26, 1993. In
May, 1993, the Chinese "Foreign Ministry was asked whether China's relationship with
the Khmer Rouge remained one of friendship. The ministry responded a day later with
one sentence stating that the Paris accord should be carried out and the four factions
treated equally. In effect, the answer seemed to be, 'Friendship? What friendship?'
Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinese Support for Khmer Rouge Grows Cooler, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 1993, at A12.
,' Graham Hutchings, China Pulls Punches After Cambodia Raid, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), May 7, 1993, at 14.
62 China Takes Swipe at Khmer Rouge in Farewell Dinner for Sihanouk, UPI, May
22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File. Although this statement
seems rather mild, within the diplomatic arena, the statements are actually harsh
considering that they are about an ex-ally.
" Lianhe Zaobo, Big Boost Awaits If Sydney Wins Olympic Bid, Bus. TIMES, Apr.
27, 1993, at 26.
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election agreements, China has repeatedly insisted that it has not shipped
arms to the Khmer Rouge.'" The latest denial was a letter written by
Chinese Premier Li Peng to Prince Ranaridh and Hun Sen insisting that:
[As to] the Khmer Rouge problem, which is an internal issue for
Cambodia, the Chinese government will not interfere. Regarding the two
prime ministers' proposal calling on the Chinese side to stop providing
benefits to the Khmer Rouge, I would like to inform you that according
to our inquiry, the Khmer Rouge has not received any benefit from the
Chinese side at all."6
In fact, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen has stated that China was opposed
to any faction in Cambodia coming to power by military means and that
China would no longer supply military ars to any rebel faction."6
The new Cambodian government has made it clear that it believes the
Chinese have stopped supplying the Khmer Rouge.67 Even the Khmer
Rouge's spokesman, Mak Ben, denied as "groundless rumours" reports
that the Khmer Rouge had been using brand new weapons supplied
from China."6
This is supported by reports that the Khmer Rouge are low on
supplies. Three mid-level Khmer Rouge officers who defected in late-June
told similar stories of low morale, especially in the southwest, due to a
scarcity of food, medicine, and money. 69 Defectors from the northwest
told similar stories about supplies not reaching units who strayed too far
from the main logistical bases in Thailand.70 Some Khmer Rouge de-
fectors said that they surrendered because they were simply too hungry to
continue fighting. 1 ' In a recent attack in Siem Riep province, Khmer
Rouge soldiers were seen carrying away television sets from houses they
Khmer Rouge Warns, supra note 132.
' Letter from Li Peng, Premier of China, to Prince Norodom Ranaridh, First Prime
Minister of Cambodia, and Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister of Cambodia (Aug. 13,
1994) (On file with author).
'66 A New Chance for the Khmer Rouge, THE AGE (Melbourne), July 26, 1993.
67 Anthony Lewis, At Home Abroad-'In Pol Pot Time,' N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1993,
at A15.
'6' See Khmer Rouge Warns, supra note 132.
" Khmer Rouge Talk, But Keep Shooting, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 17, 1993 [hereinaf-
ter Khmer Rouge Talk].
170 Murdoch, Rebel Gives Up, supra note 152.
.. See Charles P. Wallace, Next Step; Cambodia Struggles Over What To Do With
Its Armies; With A New Transitional Government in Place, Soldiers From the Four
Major Factions Remain a Major Threat to Stability, L.A. TIMEs, July 6, 1993, at 2.
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had just raided."= Khmer Rouge soldiers, under the pressure caused by
lack of supplies, are apparently resorting to looting and their leaders are
no longer able to command the level of discipline they once did.
Another sign that Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge is diminish-
ing is the Khmer Rouge's increased hostility towards the Chinese. Now
that they have nothing to lose, the Khmer Rouge are able to treat the
Chinese in the same way they treat the rest of the world. For example,
approximately one month before the elections, the Khmer Rouge bombed
the compound of Chinese U.N. peacekeepers in Kompong Thom Prov-
ince."7
ii. Thailand
The Thai government has followed in China's footsteps on the issue
of aid to the Khmer Rouge. Thai support of the CGDK and specifically
the Khmer Rouge was based upon its need to create a buffer between
itself and Vietnam. With an independent and legitimate government in
Phnom Penh, this need is of only diminished importance. Since the
signing of the peace agreement, the Thais have withdrawn their public
support of the Khmer Rouge. They have called for an end to the fighting
and have urged the Khmer Rouge to make peace." In fact, the Thai
government has made an announcement that it does not support the
Khmer Rouge and that unless they disarm, the Khmer Rouge would be
considered outlaws. 7 In addition, the Thai government recently opposed
the attempts of the Khmer Rouge to create its own government and stated
that "Thailand reaffirms our unequivocal support for the Royal Govern-
ment of Cambodia ... .",176
Thailand has also attempted to stop the flow of arms to the Khmer
Rouge. The Thais shut down Unit 838, a special military unit through
which flowed most of the Chinese and Thai aid destined for the Khmer
' Lewis, supra note 167, at A15.
'r See Hugo Gordon, Khmers Launch Biggest Attack Since U.N. Arrival With
Elections Two Weeks Away, Rivals Are Re-Arming to Settle Accounts As Europe and
America Agonise Over Intervening in Bosnia, Cambodia Has Lessons to Offer, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 10, 1993, at 10; Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinese Support for Khmer
Rouge Grows Cooler, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1993, at A12.
' See Khmer Rouge Says It Will Defend Its Territory, AGENcE FRANCE PRESSE,
Sept. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, AFP File [hereinafter Khmer Rouge
Will Defend].
"Ts Lindsay Murdoch, Khmer Rouge Are Still Free To Cross Their Last Frontier,
THE AGE (Melbourne), Oct. 26, 1993 [hereinafter Khmer Rouge Still Free].
76 Thailand Deplores Khmer Rouge Government Bid, REUTERS, July 22, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Cambod File.
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Rouge.Y The Thai Army Commander-In-Chief, General Wimol
Wongwanich, is transferring those military officers with the most blatant
dealings with the Khmer Rouge.' Recently, the Thai National Security
Council decided to end all relations between Thailand and the Khmer
Rouge and to prohibit all entries and exits across the Thailand-Cambodia
border by the Khmer Rouge."9
Other actions of the Thai government have clearly shown a distanc-
ing from the Khmer Rouge. They have made a commitment to equip and
train the new unified army of Cambodia.' In addition, the Thais have
also enforced, although erratically, an embargo on the importation of
Cambodian gems and timber, the main source of money for the Khmer
Rouge. In the meantime, the Thais have gone out of their way to be
neutral in the battles between the Khmer Rouge and the government,
telling the Khmer Rouge to stay on their side of the border.'
The final result was put succinctly by one observer, who noted,
There is little doubt that Pol Pot feels isolated and vulnerable. His
international backers, notably China, appear uninterested in providing
any more material supplies or political support. His domestic allies
during a fourteen-year civil war have divided the spoils of office with
their former Phnom Penh adversaries. Leaked speeches made by Pol Pot
in recent years reveal that he feared more than anything the exact events
that have befallen his group as a result of the U.N. peace plan."
I Khmer Rouge Still Free, supra note 175.
178 Id.
'79 See Thailand: Officials Decide to End Contacts with Khmer Rouge, REUrERS,
Oct. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
18o See Army Agrees to Train Khmer Forces, BANGKOK PosT, Aug. 15, 1993.
"' "Although renewed fighting in northern Cambodia has sent dozens of artillery
shells into Thailand, Thai troops are holding fire to avoid being accused of helping any
one side, officers said yesterday. Thai troops will not retaliate against an overspill or
fire warning shots, said Col. Suchart Pakdipinit, commander of the infantry Special
Task Force Six stationed some 100 metres from the disputed area. Thailand wants to
avoid being misunderstood of helping any one group . .. ." Thai Troops Hold Their
Fire Despite Artillery Barrage, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 3, 1993. "The guerrillas, under
the command of Gen. Sok Piap, have moved close to the Thai border in Nong Ian
which juts into Cambodia. The movement prompted a Thai army officer to rush to talk
to the guerrillas and to warn them not to use Thai territory in their attack against
Phnom Penh forces. Security on the Thai side of the border has also been beefed up
to prevent the fighting from spilling over into Thailand. Additional paramilitary rangers
and Border Patrol policemen backed up by armored personnel carriers and armored cars
have been rushed to key border points south of this border district. Khmers Flee Ghost
Town Haunted by Khmer Rouge Gunners, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 3, 1993.
182 Lindsay Murdoch, Will It Be A Return to the Killing Fields?, THE AGE (Mel-
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Unfortunately, some Khmer Rouge troops remained well-armed even
after the elections. The Khmer Rouge leaders had ordered that Chinese
weapons be stockpiled before the Chinese ended their shipments. In
addition, private Thai businessmen and some members of the Thai
military have not cut their ties to the Khmer Rouge, allowing the trade in
gems and lumber to continue even after aid shipments from the Chinese
and Thai governments ceased arriving." Khmer Rouge troops are re-
ported to have received new weapons, including long-range artillery, in
March of 1993, which were said to have been purchased from private
Thai businessmen with money from gem and lumber sales.'
However, efforts to cut off the Khmer Rouge's sources of income
have achieved some success. The U.N.-sponsored embargo on lumber
sales was somewhat effective in limiting one of the most lucrative trade
products for the Khmer Rouge. U.N. officials noted that the ban had
caused a steady decline in lumber sales in the run-up to the elections. In
May of 1993, there were nine reported violations of the ban involving
2,596 logs as opposed to forty-one reported violations of the ban involv-
ing 38,722 logs in January." More importantly, the figures for logs
headed for Thailand, the Khmer Rouge's main trading partner, was 600
in May as opposed to 13,255 in January.'6 More importantly, after the
United Nations departed, the Thais instituted their own embargo for fear
of angering the world by undermining a United Nations operation that
will cost at least $1.5 billion. The Thai military has imposed strict
controls on contacts between Thai civilians and the Khmer Rouge,
bringing the gem and logging trade to a trickle."
bourne), July 14, 1993, at 18 [herinafter Murdoch, A Return to the Killing Fields?].
"1 See Cambodia, The End of the Beginning, BANGKOK POST, Aug., 19, 1993. It is
estimated that the Khmer Rouge have annual revenues of $250 million dollars from
their illegal trade with Thailand. See also Ben Kieman, Let Cambodians Have Justice
at Last, N.Y. TrMms, Oct. 29, 1993, at A28. The continued illegal trade is not sur-
prising given the fact that Thai gem-mining companies have invested $120 million in
Khmer' Rouge territories; Fisher, supra note 3.
' Khmer Rouge Talk, supra note 169.
" Susan Cunnigham, After A Brief Respite, Logging is Cutting Its Way Back,
BANGKOK POST, Aug. 24, 1993. Apparently, one of the reasons the ban was effective
was that destination countries, such as Thailand, Laos, and Japan feared adverse
publicity enough to impound illegal logs. Id.
18 Id.
" See Naowarat Sumsakran, New Military Policy on KR Affecting Pailin Gem
Trade, BANGKOK POST, July 31, 1994. Only 12 out of 200 gem mines are operational.
Id. Furniture makers were told that they had to quit or relocate at the end of July as
part of the new policy against the Khmer Rouge. Id.
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4. The Consequences
Of course, this turn in the fortunes of the Khmer Rouge is only a
benefit if it is in Cambodia's best interest for the Khmer Rouge to be
weakened or eliminated. Although this may seem self-evident, it is still
worthwhile to articulate the most important reasons that a weakened or
non-existent Khmer Rouge is beneficial for Cambodia's future.
First, there is no sign that the Khmer Rouge have given up their
notorious ways. Although the Khmer Rouge have attempted to implement
a new policy to win the hearts and minds of the Cambodian people, this
does not signify a fundamental shift in their ideology. It is geared only
towards gaining support among the populace. The Khmer Rouge used a
similar ruse when they were attempting to come to power in the early
1970s. Their ulterior motives are made clear by the exceptions to the new
policy. Those persons already under their control in refugee camps and in
Cambodia still do not have basic human rights. 8 ' The policy similarly
does not apply to those who need to be "reeducated," those connected
with the SOC, and those who could be drafted as soldiers or porters.'89
In addition, the program of hate and murder against ethnic Vietnamese is
a sign that the Khmer Rouge are no less violent today than they were in
the 1970s. As one Western military source who specializes in guerrilla
organizations stated, "We should never forget that such 'Maoist' radical
groups never give up. They will pursue their goal, which is to take
power, by all means available.""
Although the Khmer Rouge claim that Pol Pot has retired and that
Khieu Samphan now is the Khmer Rouge representative, almost all ana-
lysts believe that Pol Pot still controls the Khmer Rouge from a base
camp near the Cambodian-Thai border. As late as February 10, 1989, The
Age reported that "Khieu Samphan refused to rule out the possibility of
a return to power by Pol Pot .. . ."" It is no wonder then, that the
Cambodia corespondent for The Age noted, "Tihere is no evidence that
the Khmer Rouge have miraculously transformed from a band of terrorists
into responsible parliamentarians."'"
Second, the Khmer Rouge have consistently hindered efforts to bring
peace and democracy to Cambodia. They have been unwilling to abide by
the cease-fire and election agreements signed in Paris. First, the Khmer
"s KqINTWORTH, supra note 99, at 7.
9 Id. at 6.
" Khmer Rouge Talk, supra note 169.
191 Id. at 17, n.59.
19 Murdoch, A Return To The Killing Fields?, supra note 182.
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Rouge refused to give United Nations personnel access to areas under
their control. Then, they refused to lay down their arms and order their
troops into cantonment camps as required by the peace agreement. The
other factions responded by also refusing to lay down their arms and
demobilize for fear of being caught by the Khmer Rouge without any
means of defense. Next, the Khmer Rouge set about to hamper the
United Nations mission. Almost all of the seventy murders of U.N.
personnel in Cambodia are attributed to the Khmer Rouge. Finally, the
Khmer Rouge refused to participate in the elections and called for
Cambodians to boycott them. Even after the elections were held, the
Khmer Rouge continued to attack the forces of the new coalition govern-
ment. At no time have the Khmer Rouge ever proved by their actions
that the good of Cambodia had priority over their own goals.
Third, the possibility of Vietnamese reintervention will hang over
Cambodia as long as the Khmer Rouge exist. Although the issue of
whether Vietnam wishes to annex Cambodia is hotly debated, there is
little doubt that Vietnam will play a significant role in the decision
making of future Cambodian government leaders. Hanoi has consistently
noted its opposition to a Khmer Rouge government of any kind in
Cambodia. Given the past history of intense Khmer Rouge antipathy
towards Vietnam and the numerous Khmer Rouge attacks on Vietnamese
settlers this is not surprising. For example, Vietnam insists that it invaded
Cambodia because the Khmer Rouge seriously impinged upon Vietnamese
national security.'93 Given the great cost of the Vietnamese involvement
in Cambodia from 1978 to 1989, Vietnam will not want that price to be
paid in vain. Although the late Nguyen Co Thach, when he was the
Vietnamese Foreign Minister, stated that Vietnam would not intervene
should the Khmer Rouge regain power and would let the consciences of
the world help Cambodia this time around, this was likely a bitter
response to the fact that Vietnam was condemned for overthrowing the
murderous Pol Pot regime.'94 More likely, if Vietnam feels its security
' VIETNAM'S INTERVENTION, supra note 35, at 15.
'9' KLINrWORTH, supra note 99, at 3. Le Bang, acting director of the Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry's Americas Department, stated "We gave up the burden of Cambodia.
We are not committing the mistake again of sending in troops and staying too long.
The military is nothing today. We can't invade Cambodia and hold it." Henry Kamm,
After the Cold War: Views From Vietnam, Vietnam, Now Master of Its Own House,
Tries to Mend Neighborhood Fences, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1992, at A3. On the other
hand, older Vietnamese apparatchiks have a different view. Major General Tran Cong
Man, a Vietnamese government spokesman, while warning against increased Thai
influence in Cambodia stated that "politically and also militarily we [Vietnam] still have
significant power to influence Laos and Cambodia." Id.
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interests are threatened, it will react, albeit with more caution this time.
Regardless whether Vietnam does actually reinvade Cambodia or not, the
mere possibility of Vietnamese intervention will prove destabilizing to the
Cambodian government. And if Vietnam should actually reinvade, this
would almost surely destroy any chance for prosperity or peace in
Cambodia for some time to come.
Thus, the words of one observer are hardly surprising. "Indeed, the
greatest enduring success of the election may be not so much to extend
democracy to Cambodia, but finally, after almost twenty years, to provide
the formal framework for the international community and Cambodians to
be rid of the Khmer Rouge." 95
5. Causation
Finally, we must determine the causal relationship between the
elections and the benefits described above. In this regard, there are two
main questions. There first is "Was there a causal relationship between
the elections and the benefits?" The second question is "If so, what was
the nature of that relationship?" In relation to the second question, we are
particularly interested in whether elections were a necessary condition or
a sufficient condition. These questions can be answered by making three
determinations: whether the elections contributed to the benefit; whether
the benefit would have occurred without elections; and whether there
were other contributing factors to the benefits.'
There is a strong argument that the elections did contribute to the
weakening of the Khmer Rouge. Although China was already in the
process of withdrawing its support for the Khmer Rouge, the elections
greatly accelerated this trend. Furthermore, the elections provided China
and Thailand not only the reason, but the means to cease aid as well.'"
The elections called for all foreign advisors to leave Cambodia and all
aid to the Cambodian factions to cease.'98 This was necessary for an
effective cease-fire and for the parties to compete fairly in the elections.
Because Vietnam, the Soviet Union, the nations of ASEAN, and the
9' Ellis, supra note 103.
196 The first determination answers the question "Was there a causal relationship
between the elections and the benefit?" The second determination answers the question
"Were elections a necessary condition for the benefit?" The third determination answers
the question "Were elections a sufficient condition for the benefit?"
,"' Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict,
Oct. 30, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 174, part I, § 4, art. 8; § 5, art. 9, U.N. Dec.
A/36/608S/23177.
'9 Id.
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United States agreed to stop supporting the other factions, China and
Thailand lost no face for ending aid shipments to the Khmer Rouge.' 9,
To the contrary, international pressure was placed upon them to stop
giving aid and they gained prestige when they did so.
Second, China and Thailand can point to the Khmer Rouge's
intractability as a reason for their withdrawal of support. In fact, this
allowed China and Thailand to take the moral high ground by pointing to
the fact that they refused to sponsor a group that reneged on a prior
agreement and was flouting international opinion. The prestige of both
countries would be increased for doing their part to bring peace and
stability to Cambodia.
Further, the elections placed the spotlight on Cambodia. For many
years, Cambodia had been a backwater of the international arena. This
allowed all manner of questionable acts to occur there without any serious
questioning. For example, the United States indirectly supported the
Khmer Rouge for many years by sending nonlethal aid to FUNCINPEC
and the KPNLF, despite the fact that both groups admitted to cooperating
and sharing supplies with the Khmer Rouge."' This occurred at the
same time that the Bush Administration was loudly denouncing the
Khmer Rougean and there existed a U.S. law forbidding direct or indi-
rect aid to the Khmer Rouge. However, the elections and the nec-
essary commitment of vast amounts of money and personnel by the
United Nations made it that much more difficult for any country to
continue supporting the Khmer Rouge because the situation could not be
ignored or explained away. This focus on Cambodia made both the
Chinese and Thai accelerate the cessation of support for the Khmer
Rouge when under normal circumstances, they would have done so only
slowly, taking advantage of the relative obscurity of the situation in
Cambodia.
'" The 23 signatories of the cease-fire and elections treaty were Australia, Brunei,
Cambodia, Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam,
Yugoslavia, and the four Cambodian factions.
' See Phil Galley, Khmer Rouge Moves to Regain Power with Indirect Aid from
U.S., ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1990, at A7 (stating that "[i]n Washington and
other world capitals, there doesn't seem to be much interest in what happens in
Cambodia, a distant land of impoverished peasants that for decades has been a pawn
in the geopolitical power games of the United States, China, and the Soviet Union").
201 Id.
Id.
See Mary McGrory, New Policy, Old Hang-Up, WASH. POST, July 24, 1990, at
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Although it is clear that the elections contributed to the cessation of
aid to the Khmer Rouge, it is not so clear that they were necessary to
bringing about the cessation. There are two arguments that one could
make concerning the necessity of the elections. The first is that there
might have been another pivotal event that could have also turned the
Chinese and Thai against the Khmer Rouge. The second is that in the
long run support for the Khmer Rouge would have ceased, even without
such an event.
It is true that there may have been other focal events that would
have caused the Chinese and Thai to stop sending aid to the Khmer
Rouge. However, it is difficult to imagine one that would have been a
clearer sign to the world community, that could have been forced upon
the Khmer Rouge, and that would be as relatively cheap in terms of
lives. The large commitment of personnel, money, and time by the United
Nations insured that the world community would pay attention to the
elections, something that could not be guaranteed in another situation.'
And elections are something to which the Khmer Rouge could not say
no. The popularity of democracy is such that few groups today can reject
the call for elections without condemnation and loss of legitimacy.
Finally, without belittling the sacrifice of those who died in order to give
the Cambodian people the chance to vote, it should be noted that the
elections were relatively cheap when compared to other events that would
have riveted the world's attention to the Khmer Rouge and Cambodia.
The reality of today's world seems to require genocide on the scale of
Rwanda or warfare equal to that in the former Yugoslavia to merit
serious attention by the world community.
However, the second argument, that the cessation of aid would have
eventually occurred without the elections, is the more compelling of the
two arguments.2"5 As explained above, the end of the Cold War brought
with it numerous reasons for the Chinese and Thai to stop sending aid.
However, this did not cause the end of support for the Khmer Rouge.
Rather, the Khmer Rouge's patrons only slowly moved away from the
notorious group. After all, the Khmer Rouge still held on to some power
in Cambodia, making them a valuable ally to some. Others, such as Thai
businessmen, were little affected by international considerations. Thus,
there was no guarantee that the aid would eventually cease or that the
Chinese and Thai would not later increase aid in response to political
' By way of contrast, the Khmer Rouge's campaign of terror against ethnic
Vietnamese in Cambodia, no matter how shocking to our consciences, has failed to get
the attention of the world community despite the fact that the killings now number into
the hundreds.
In essence, the focal event was the ending of the Cold War.
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changes in the world. The elections, on the other hand, brought an abrupt
end to the Chinese and Thai support, making the resumption of aid more
difficult. Given the uncertainty of an eventual cessation without the
elections and the strong likelihood that the elections did end support, the
real question is whether the added assurance of the elections was worth
the added cost of the elections. Given what we know about the Khmer
Rouge, the answer must be yes.
Related to this is the issue of whether there were other contributing
factors. The answer here must also be yes. In addition to the elections, at
least two things stand out when we consider the causes of the
delegitimation of the Khmer Rouge - the willingness of the world
community to take the elections seriously and the eagerness of the
Cambodian people to participate in elections. First, one could easily
imagine the scenario where patron states continued to support their clients
even in the face of a clear showing of lack of domestic legitimacy. For
example, China and Thailand continued to support the Khmer Rouge
during the 1980s, long after the world had learned of the brutality of
their rule. In addition, one would fear that the Cambodian people, beaten
into submission by authoritarian rule; mass murder;, and starvation failed
to participate in the elections. If there had been low turnout, the mandate
of the victors would have been far from clear'
In conclusion, it is clear that the elections affected the delegitimation
of the Khmer Rouge. Further, although it is not clear that elections were
the only way to bring this about, they were probably the best alternative.
Finally, lest too much credit be given to elections, it must be remembered
that at least two other factors must be present before the elections have
the effects that we have described here. The people inside the country
must be willing to participate in the elections and the world community
must be willing to abide by them.
C. The Formation of a Legitimate and Functioning Government
1. Introduction
The second important benefit of the elections was the fact that the
three non-Khmer Rouge factions formed a legitimate and viable govern-
ment. Each of the three factions that participated in the elections gained
political legitimacy and political power. Although FUNCINPEC won a
' Note that both of these factors do not directly affect the benefit, but determine
the likelihood that the elections will bring about the benefit. Thus, although elections
are not the only factor in bringing about the benefits, they are probably the most
important factor.
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plurality of the votes in the elections, the SOC-backed CPP and Son
Sann's BLDP were also legitimized. This is reflected in the distribution
of power in the new government. Although Prince Ranaridh is the First
Prime Minister, Hun Sen of CPP is the Second Prime Minister and Son
Sann is the President of the Assembly.
Having gained political legitimacy and political power, it is more
difficult for any of the parties to defect and return to using violent
methods. In order to protect their stake in the new government, each of
the factions has to cooperate in order to fight off the Khmer Rouge,
which has attacked government areas and has vowed to defend its territo-
ries.' This increases the stability of the new government.
2. The Premise
The question that we must answer is, "Was the political structure
before the elections conducive to peace, stability, prosperity, or democra-
cy?" Before the elections, there were two competing groups, the CGDK
and the SOC, each claiming to be the legitimate government of Cambo-
dia. It is clear that the CGDK was in no position to bring about peace,
stability, prosperity, or democracy. First, the CGDK controlled relatively
little land inside Cambodia. It operated mainly out of refugee camps
located within Thailand. Although it did control the people in these
camps, the refugee population numbered only 350,000.'
But even within the small area controlled by the CGDK, the coali-
tion proved ineffective at making progress, largely because it was at best
an uneasy alliance. It took the urging of their sponsors to get the Khmer
Rouge, Prince Sihanouk's royalist FUNCINPEC, and Son Sann's rightist
KPNLF to agree to form a coalition in 1982' Even then, the factions
agreed to work together only in order to force the Vietnamese out of
Cambodia and overthrow the SOC government. However, the members of
the CGDK rarely worked together. The factions within the coalition
fought each other as often they battled the Vietnamese and SOC
troops.210
The main reason for the intra-CGDK hostility was that the composi-
tion of the CGDK made little sense. The KPNLF was a right-wing group
2 See Khmer Rouge Will Defend, supra note 174.
Actually, the refugees consisted of 14,000 people who were granted refugee status
and 350,000 people who were not granted refugee status. Steven R. Ratner, The
Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 (1993). These latter were
to be repatriated by the United Nations. Id.
SHIN, supra note 88, at 195-97; STROMSETH, supra note 93, at 4.
210 STROMSETH, supra note 93, at 6.
434 [Vol. 28:395
CAMBODIAN ELECTIONS
supported by the United States and the core of the KPNLF's cadres were
remnants from the Lon Nol government. This made it the target of much
of the Khmer Rouge's brutality after the Khmer Rouge defeated the Lon
Nol government. Although Prince Sihanouk acted as a figurehead for the
Khmer Rouge in the 1970s, he quickly became disillusioned when it
became clear that the Khmer Rouge were merely using him to gain
support. In fact, Sihanouk has revealed that many members of his family
were murdered by the Khmer Rouge.2" He cannot help but despise
them for what they did to his family and to the Cambodian people.
In addition to being ineffective, the coalition structure had detrimen-
tal effects. The inclusion of the Khnier Rouge in the CGDK made a
negotiated solution in Cambodia unlikely. The SOC refused at first to
discuss any plan involving the Khmer Rouge. Although Son Sann and
Sihanouk may have wanted to negotiate with the SOC, they were forced
by the coalition structure to refrain from doing so.
And the Khmer Rouge were given a modicum of legitimacy by their
association with the CGDK. For example, the CGDK was the representa-
tive of Cambodia at the United Nations. By agreement among the parties,
it was the Khmer Rouge representative who headed CGDK's permanent
mission to the United Nations.1
The CGDK's adversary, the SOC, was not in a much better position
to bring peace, stability, prosperity, or democracy. Although it controlled
and administered the majority of Cambodia's land and people, the SOC
lacked political legitimacy. The government was installed by the hated
Vietnamese after an invasion condemned by the United Nations. This
meant, for example, that it could not get aid from abroad2"3 nor com-
plete cooperation from its people. With the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, the situation only became
211 Baker, supra note 103. Sihanouk blames the Khmer Rouge for the deaths of five
of his children and 14 grandchildren during their bloody reign in the mid-1970s. Id.
"You know, they killed them all, the Pol Pot faction, the Khmer Rouge. I have every
reason to hate the Khmer Rouge." Id.
212 SHIN, supra note 88, at 203.22
213 See, e.g., Kenneth Wolf, Trading With Cambodia; Tourists Flock to Cambodia
as Businesses Sit on Sideline, J. COM., June 11, 1992, at A4 (discussing the rise of
tourism industry after the United States lifted its trade embargo against Cambodia). The
United States instituted a trade embargo against Cambodia after the fall of Lon Noi.
The U.S. kept the embargo in place during the entire time the SOC had de facto
control of Cambodia. See Frank Jata, National Security, in CAMBODIA, A COUNTRY
STUDY 250-60 (1990). The embargo was not lifted until January 4, 1992, after the
signing of the peace agreement calling for elections. Hong-Phong Pho & George Paine,
Cambodia Breakthrough, Bus. AM., Apr. 20, 1992, at 21.
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worse. However, neither side was able to defeat the other. There was no
way to break the stalemate.
3. The Creation of the Royal Government of Cambodia
There is little doubt that nominally, the three non-Khmer Rouge
factions have formed a coalition government formally known as the Royal
Government of Cambodia. However, that would be of little importance if
the three factions had not worked together as a unified government or if
the coalition had turned out to be unstable. Fortunately, that was not the
case. The new coalition is stable and its members have proven that they
can work together effectively. Since coming to power, the government has
been able to draft and ratify the constitution, to enact necessary legisla-
tion, to administer the country, and to create a unified army. 4 The
leaders of the factions have shown an ability to work together and
compromise. For example, when it became clear that a cabinet reshuffle
would be necessary, both FUNCINPEC and CPP appointees were dis-
missed.21
Without a doubt, each of the factions has problems with the other.
The KPNLF is controlled by Son Sann and its military arm, the Khmer
People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), was founded by
Dien Del."6 Both of these men were officers in the Lon Nol gov-
ernment, which ousted Sihanouk from power.2 " The SOC has been
fighting the two other factions and it did implement a campaign of terror
against activists of FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF in the months before
the elections. For example, Prince Ranaridh blames the SOC for the
murder of 46 FUNCINPEC activists in the months directly preceding the
elections.218
234 See infra text accompanying notes 221-29.
2,5 Interview with Prince Norodom Ranaridh, First Prime Minister of Cambodia, in
Phnom Penh, Cambodia (Aug. 17, 1994). Among those to be purged were Finance
Minister Sam Rainsy, a member of the prince's own FUNCINPEC party, Commerce
Minister Va Huot, and Agriculture Minister Kong Sam 01, both of whom are members
of the rival CPP. Id. The general feeling is that the reshuffle does not mean trouble
within the government and, although the men replaced were well-regarded, that there
are many others who would do a good job. Harish Mehta, Cambodia's Foreign
Minister Threatens to Quit, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 24, 1994, at 3; Maja
Wallengren, Foreigners Upbeat on New Cambodia Finance Minister, REuTERs, Oct. 24,
1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
236 SHIN, supra note 88, at 194.
237 Even though Son Sann was Sihanouk's Prime Minister, the two clearly feel
antipathy towards each other. STROMSETH, supra note 93, at 9.
21' Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia's Fate Now Rests on the New Leaders From A
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However, none of the three non-Khmer Rouge factions views the
others in the same way that they view the Khmer Rouge - as an
implacable foe who cannot be allowed to return to power. They do not
fear the ascension to power of one of their partners to the same degree
that they fear a Khmer Rouge victory.219 Thus, each faction is motivated
to work with the others by the common goal of. stopping the Khmer
Rouge. Son Sann's faction was most victimized by the Khmer Rouge.
Sihanouk has renounced them. The Hun Sen government is composed of
many ex-Khmer Rouge who went to Vietnam because they had disagreed
with Pol Pot and feared reprisal.
In addition, the leaders of the faction understand that staying within
the coalition government is in its best interest. The domestic political
power and political legitimacy of each of the factions is directly related
to their participation in the elections and their position within the new
coalition government. If any of them were to leave the coalition govern-
ment, it would be faced with the withdrawal of aid from its sponsors and
a decrease in domestic popularity. Each faction must weigh seriously the
cost of a decision to return to fighting because the disintegration of the
new government would mean increased misery for the Cambodian people
and the destruction of a project in which the various countries of the
world, through the United Nations, will have spent over $2.3 billion.
Thus, it is no surprise that Hun Sen, when speaking about his position,
clearly understood the constraints placed upon him by the need to retain
legitimacy.
There is no doubt about this co-premiership issue. It is mentioned
clearly in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia that during the
first legislature of the National Assembly there will be two prime
ministers. So there is no need to discuss or think about this question -
whether there should be one or two prime ministers. If only one prime
minister is needed, it is better to wait until after the elections in
1998.22
Therefore, although the future of the new coalition government is not
guaranteed, it holds out a greater prospect for stability than Cambodia has
seen in over two decades.
Bloody Past, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 25, 1993, at 20 [hereinafter Murdoch,
Cambodia's Fate].
2i9 For example, as early as 1989, Hun Sen had received the support of Son Sann
and Sihanouk supporters such as In Tam, a Prime Minister under Lon Nol's govern-
ment. JusuF WANANDI, THE CAMBODIAN CoNFLIcr 7 (1989).
22 Interview with Hun Sen, Second Prime Minister of Cambodia, in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia (July 14, 1994).
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4. The Consequences
The new government of Cambodia, because it possesses both politi-
cal power and political legitimacy, is able to accomplish tasks that would
have been impossible for the SOC or the CGDK. Politically, the RGC
has been recognized as the true government of Cambodia by the vast
majority of nations in the world. In addition, the existence of a legitimate
indigenous government has made it difficult for the Khmer Rouge rank
and file to continue believing that they are fighting against foreigners for
Cambodia's independence. Militarily, the members of the RGC have
effectively joined their forces together to fight the Khmer Rouge. Eco-
nomically, the new government has enacted reforms geared towards
bringing about rapid economic growth on a country-wide scale.
a. Politically
It is within the political arena that the creation of the new coalition
has had its most salient effect. Because of the high turnout at the elec-
tions and certification by UNTAC that the elections were free and fair,
the new government is widely recognized as the legitimate government of
Cambodia. The United Nations Security Council has recognized the
results of the election."2 In fact, the United States has normalized rela-
tions with the new Cambodian government, upgrading its mission to a
full embassy.' 2 The Vietnamese government has stated its willingness
to accept the new government.' The Thai Prime Minister has vowed
to seek closer relations with the new government. 4 Even the Khmer
Rouge have sent emissaries to the new government seeking an advisory
221 See Accord On Interim Rule Reported, L.A. TIMEs, June 16, 1993, at AS.
222 See U.S. Establishes Diplomatic Ties With Cambodia After 18 Years, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1993, at A4.
222 Vietnam Will Recognise Cambodia's New Government to be Elected by a
Constitutional National Assembly, VIETNAM NV. REv., June 7, 1993 ("The Government
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam expresses its willingness to recognise a new
government in Cambodia to be elected by a constitutional National Assembly.") During
a visit to Hanoi, Cambodian Co-Prime Ministers Prince Norodom Ranaridh and Hun
Sen, met with Vietnamese leaders Party Secretary General Do Muoi, President Le Duc
Anh, and Premier Vo Van Kiet. Muoi told his guests that Hanoi "would work relent-
lessly to strengthen the durable friendship, good neighbourliness and fraternal solidarity
between the two countries." Nguyen Tri Dung, Vietnam: Cambodian Co-Premiers
Hailed in Hanoi, VIETNAM INv. REv., Aug. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Txtine File.
224 Chuan Vows to Promote Ties With Cambodia, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 14, 1993,
at 7.
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role.
22
At home, the new government is also perceived to be legitimate.
Between the installation of the new government and the end of Sep-
tember, 1993, 1,500-2,000 Khmer Rouge soldiers defected.' The deser-
tions occur partly because of the lack of supplies, but also because many
Khmer Rouge soldiers no longer have a reason to fight. In Kompong
Thorn province in early September, 1993, Colonel Sy Ninh and his men
defected to the new government.' Colonel Ninh, a twenty-year veteran
of the Khmer Rouge and commander of the much-feared Division 616,
explained, "We were not told the truth. We were told we were fighting
to defend Cambodia from the Vietnamese. But in the end we realised we
were only killing Cambodians."' He and his men deserted despite the
fact that they risk death if they should fall into the hands of their ex-
comrades. "We were afraid what might happen to us, but we decided to
surrender because we want peace," he explained. 9 According to
Christophe Peschoux, a French authority on the Khmer Rouge who is
attached to the United Nations, "The Khmer Rouge are facing their worst
political and ideological crisis since 1979. Their propaganda mill is totally
exhausted. They're finding it more and more difficult to keep their forces
mobilized."°
Another sign of the government's legitimacy is that the two coup
attempts that have occurred have been quite feeble; neither was a real
threat to the new government. The first occurred soon after the elections.
In late-July, 1993, General Sin Song, ex-minister of national security of
the former SOC, and Prince Norodom Chakkrapong, ex-vice-premier of
the former SOC, attempted to carry out the secession of seven eastern
provinces, which fizzled out in days for want of support281 Then, one
year later, on July 2, 1994, the same two men attempted an armed revolt
See Khmer Rouge Talk, supra note 169.
Branigin, supra note 99. The same number was 300 for the period between
January, 1992 and June, 1993. Id. The United Nations has confirmed at least 1,500
defectors. Id. These defections will only make the new government stronger as many
of the Khmer Rouge are to be integrated into the new unified army according to Tea
Banh, the deputy defense minister. See Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia: Cambodia's
Leaders Heal Rift Over Power, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 17, 1993, at 8.
Murdoch, Rebel Gives Up, supra note 151. There are reports that Division 616
has practically disintegrated. Branigin, supra note 99.
' Murdoch, Rebel Gives Up, supra note 157.
2 Id.
o Branigin, supra note 99.
' Nicholas Ctmuning-Bruce, Cambodia Foils Feeble Coup By Sihanouk's Son, THE
GUARDIAN (Lonndon), July 4, 1994, at 9.
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which was put down without any bloodshed. 2 The abortive coup ended
when troops of the newly unified army intercepted approximately 200
heavily-armed soldiers traveling to Phnom Penh in a dozen armored
personnel carriers and several lorries, approximately twenty miles east of
the capital. 3
b. Militarily
In the military arena, the three factions have unified their armed
forces - the Royalist Armee National Sihanoukiste (ANS), the SOC's
Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF), and Son Sann's Khmer
People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), in order to fight
the Khmer Rouge. 4 Although the results are mixed, the new army has
made substantial progress in the fight against the Khmer Rouge. For
example, in August, 1993, the new army, known as the Khmer Royal
Army (KRA), launched an offensive in Banteay Meanchey province in
northwest Cambodia along the Thai border." According to defectors,
the offensive was successful in destroying the fighting ability of the
Khmer Rouge units. The new army captured 100 Khmer Rouge soldiers
and an important Khmer Rouge arms depot at Phum Chhat with forty-five
122 mm. and 130 mm. artillery pieces, 100 B-40 rocket launchers, and a
large supply of AK-47 assault rifles. 6 Then in February, the KRA
captured Anlong Veng, a major Khmer Rouge base. 7 The following
month, on March 19, 1994, the unified army captured Pailin, the unoffi-
cial capital of the Khmer Rouge and a major gem-mining base. Although
the Khmer Rouge later retook these two cities, most commentators agree
that the Khmer Rouge's 12,000-man army is not capable of overthrowing
the new government. 8 As one senior UNTAC military official stated,
"We still believe that the Khmer Rouge could not go very far on the
232 Statement of Sok An, Co-Minister attached to the Office of the Council of
Ministers of Cambodia, in Phnom Penh (July 3, 1994) (On file with author). Sok An
noted that there were unfounded rumors that either FUNCINPEC or CPP instigated the
coup against the other. Id.
3 Cumming-Bruce, supra note 231, at 9.
Anuraj Manibhandu, Settlement Foreseeable, BANGKOK POST, June 15, 1993, at
1.
235 Murdoch, Rebel Gives Up, supra note 151.
2" See Government Counters and Rebels Regain Base, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 20,
1993.
3 Mark Dodd, Cambodia Governor Says Khmer Rouge Can Be Beaten, REUTERS,
June 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
238 Dodd, supra note 120; see also Pol Pot's Men, supra note 119.
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battlefield. Their northern troops are the only ones still operational." 9
In contrast, the outlook for the KRA is good. It is set to implement a
reform plan that Brigadier General Mark Hamilton, the head of a U.S.
military assessment team, found impressive and professional. 2 In addi-
tion, several countries, including France and Thailand, have agreed to
send military experts to help train the new army.24" '
c. Economically
The new government has also made efforts towards increasing
economic growth. Its activities in this area could only be implemented by
a legitimate government controlling a large portion of the land and
people. In a meeting with ASEAN, Cambodia's new foreign minister,
Prince Norodom Sirivudh, promised that foreign investments would be
protected and encouraged by the new government.' 2 After the elections,
Sam Rainsy, then the Minister of Finance, vowed to institute market-
oriented reforms in Cambodia and encouraged overseas investment.243
Ouk Vibol, a member of the National Investment Committee (the group
within the Ministry of Planning that is directly responsible for investment)
echoed the sentiment. "Trade and investment are among the priorities,
since we have to reconstruct our country and these two areas will certain-
ly contribute."' In keeping with this priority on investment, the Nation-
al Assembly recently passed an investment law considered to be among
the most liberal in the region2 5 The presence of a pro-investment coali-
tion government has lured many investors back to Cambodia after years
of war. In addition, the International Monetary Fund ( F has given
Khmer Rouge Talk, supra note 169.
24 Cambodia: U.S. General Impressed by Cambodian Army Reform, REUTERS, Sept.
23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
242 See France to Help Train Cambodia's New Army, WASH. TIMES, July 7, 1993,
at A2.
242 See Foreign Investments Will Be Protected - Phnom Penh, Bus. TIMES (Malay-
sia), July 24, 1993.
243 Cambodian Official Promotes Investment, J. COM., July 28, 1993, at A3.
244 Brian Hansford, New Legislature May Change How Business Is Done in Cambo-
dia, But Thais Say They Will Stay, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 24, 1993.
245 KHMER INvESTMENT LAW ENDORSED BY ASSEMBLY, BANGK. POST, Sept. 26,
1994. The law has a nine percent corporate income tax, allows for up to eight years
tax exemption, has a 100% duty exemption on materials imported by export-oriented in-
dustries, and allows investors to use land for up to 70 years with the ability to renew
thereafter. Id.
2" Chris Burslem, Foreign Investors Trickling Back Into Cambodia After Political
Pact, J. CoM., July 6, 1993, at A5.
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Cambodia high marks for its economic program. 7 A recent IMF report
credited the new government with containing inflation, faithfully following
a controlled budget, improving the government's foreign-exchange re-
serves, and bringing about a reasonably stable exchange rate.2
5. Causation
Here, we will determine if the elections contributed at all to the
creation of the new government and its legitimacy and success. In
addition, we will also discuss the possibility of the formation of such a
government without the elections and determine whether there were other
factors that contributed to the creation of the new government.
As this Article has already argued, the elections almost certainly
contributed to the creation of a legitimate and functioning coalition gov-
ernment by the three non-Khmer Rouge factions. In fact, the creation of
such a government was the goal of the elections. However it is true that
the elections were not self-enforcing and the victors did not necessarily
have to join the new government. Nonetheless, there were domestic and
international pressures inherent in the elections to abide by the results.
This made it likely that all victors in the elections would eventually join.
And once the government was formed, the legitimacy conferred by the
elections insured that the government had the domestic and international
support necessary to administer to the country in an effective manner.
Thus, it is implausible that the elections failed to contribute to the for-
mation and effectiveness of the new government.
It is also unlikely that the coalition government would have been
created without the elections. Before the ceasefire and election agreement
was signed in 1991, the SOC had made multiple overtures to Sihanouk
and Son Sann. Although both had shown an interest in negotiating,
nothing ever came of the discussions. But even if the three factions had
allied with each other through their own efforts or at the urging of their
patrons, such a government would not have been nearly as stable and
24 Cambodia: IMF Hails Former Ministers Reforms, RErRS, Oct. 20, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File. On a visit to Cambodia, former
Japanese foreign minister Michio Watanabe was equally impressed by the pace of
economic reconstruction. Former Japanese Minister Optimistic on Cambodia, REUTERS,
Oct. 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
24 Maja Wallengren, IMF Sees Cambodian Economic Development, REUTERS, Sept.
30, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File. For example, inflation in
Cambodia for the first six months of 1994 ran at 11%, compared to 84% for the same
period in the previous year. Cambodia National Bank Reports Inflation Contained,
REUTERS, Aug. 25, 1994, available on LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
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powerful as this one. Most importantly, it would have lacked political
legitimacy. Its status would have been little better than that of the Viet-
namese-backed SOC. Although it would have de facto control of the
country, its governance would lack the same moral dimension.
In addition, without the legitimacy, much of the reason for a new
government would be lost. Such a government could not expect wide-
spread recognition by other countries, nor could it expect the people to
rally behind it. Nor could it expect demoralization from an enemy that
was able to exhort its soldiers to fight harder against a coalition created
by foreign meddling or backroom deals. Most importantly, there would be
no reason to remain faithful to the new government outside of self-
interest, which changes over time. Each faction would have little incentive
to relinquish control over its military forces, seek compromises with the
other factions, or legislate for the benefit of the country as a whole. Each
faction would understand that there would be nothing to stop the other
factions from leaving the government the second the alliance was no
longer of value. That is the difference between a legitimate government
chosen by the people and an alliance created by a few men. This is
supported by the experience of the two coalitions created without the
input of the populace and solely through the negotiations of the Cambodi-
an parties and their international patrons. The first group was the CGDK,
the coalition government composed of the Khmer Rouge, FUNCINPEC,
and the KPNLF. The CGDK was created shortly after the Vietnamese
invasion to fight the SOC and the Vietnamese. The second organization
was the Supreme National Council (SNC), a coalition composed of the
four major parties. The SNC was created after the ceasefire and election
agreement to help the United Nations administer Cambodia pending the
elections. Both organizations claimed to be the sovereign government of
Cambodia and both lacked the imprimatur of the Cambodian people. As
might be expected, both coalitions were never really able to effectively
administer the country nor get the support of more than small blocks of
the international community. In addition, both coalitions were unstable
and fighting often occurred among the members of the coalition.
However, although the elections were almost certainly necessary to
form a functioning and legitimate government, it is clear that the elections
alone did not bring about the formation of a new government. Another
important factor was the willingness of the coalition partners to join with
one another. Although the elections certainly brought domestic and
international pressure for the winners of the election to form a govern-
ment, there is reason to believe that this need not have been the case.
The fact that the CPP initially did not agree to abide by the results points
to strong countervailing pressures such as a desire and the fear of punish-
ment for prior bad acts, that somewhat mitigated the pressure to join the
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government. Although the CPP did eventually agree to be part of a new
government, one should not take for granted the absence of such counter-
vailing pressures.
In conclusion, we can be confident that the elections contributed to
the formation of a coalition government. Although there is uncertainty as
to whether elections are the only method of forming a coalition govern-
ment, there is evidence that it is the method that forms the strongest,
most stable, and most legitimate governments. Finally, we should not
forget that elections cannot do it by themselves. At least one prerequisite
is some inclination on the part of the future members of the coalition
government to cooperate with one another.
D. The Return of Sihanouk
1. Introduction
The third benefit of the elections in Cambodia is that it conferred
political power upon the person with the most political legitimacy in
Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk. He is credited with bringing
independence to Cambodia and protecting it from the ravages of the war
in neighboring Vietnam. His popularity is complemented by the aura of
royalty. Although he may be eccentric, few people question his devotion
to Cambodia. It is for these reasons that Sihanouk is treated with rever-
ence by a great number of the Cambodia people. The elections were a
vehicle through which the citizens showed their admiration of Sihanouk
and granted political power to him.
2. The Premise
The question that needs to be answered is, did Sihanouk possess
little political power and much political legitimacy before the election?
There is little dispute that Sihanouk has held relatively little power since
he was overthrown. Although he is personally popular, until recently,
power in Cambodia was measured, by the number of people controlled
and men under arms. Unfortunately for Sihanouk, FUNCINPEC adminis-
tered only 35,000 refugees out of a population of six to eight million
Cambodians249 and its military arm was estimated to have less than
10,000 soldiers." It was dwarfed by the SOC's army, the Khmer
Rouge's army, and the Vietnamese occupation force. In fact, after his
overthrow, Sihanouk became a Khmer Rouge prisoner and was always
249 Al Santoli, Endless Insurgency: Cambodia, WASH. Q., Spring 1985, at 61.
Wallace, supra note 171, at 2.
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escorted by the Khmer Rouge personally wherever he went. In order to
finally escape, Sihanouk had to surreptitiously slip an asylum request to
a U.S. Secret Service agent while in New York to attend a session of the
United Nations 1 Thus, there is little doubt that Sihanouk had little real
power.
The issue of whether Sihanouk was politically popular is more
debatable. There is no disputing that he was successfully overthrown in
a coup in 1970. However, many large-scale protests erupted in reaction
to the coup, even though Sihanouk was no longer in the country. Further,
there is no dispute that Sihanouk was instrumentally involved in bringing
about the independence of Cambodia and received much credit for this.
And even after his overthrow, he was much sought after to be the
face of sundry organizations, in order to impute his popular support. The
Khmer Rouge and China sought him out after Lon Nol overthrew him.
He was the clear choice to be the head of the CGDK when it was
formed. And after the cease-fire and election agreements were signed, he
became head of the Supreme National Council (SNC), an organization
consisting of the four factions created as an interim government before
the elections. His value as a leader must have been based on his popular-
ity as neither he nor his followers were particularly powerful.
Finally, the elections, which were generally agreed to have been free
and fair, gave Sihanouk's party a plurality of the votes. Since none of the
other candidates in his party has anything approaching Sihanouk's visi-
bility or popularity, it is generally agreed that FUNCINPEC won because
it was associated with Sihanouk. One commentator stated that "Prince
Ranaridh['s royalist party] rode to victory in large part on the prestige
and popularity of his father." 2 Even the Khmer Rouge support granting
power to Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge civilians who were allowed to
vote were instructed to vote for FUNCINPEC. 3 It is no wonder then,
that "[m]ost Cambodians ... credit Sihanouk with being the single
unifying symbol among the different factions which are now in an uneasy
coalition government. They call this ailing man, in whom rests the hope
for durable peace, "deva-raj" (god-king). 'z 4
The hold that he has over the people of Cambodia also insures that
5' CHANDA, supra note 17, at 363-69.
22 Mark Baker, Prince Run Around Plays the Devil They Know, THE AGE, (Mel-
bourne), June 9, 1993. During the elections, Ranaridh stated that a vote for his party
was a vote for his father. Philip Shenon, Cambodian Prince Tells Troops to Prepare
to Fight Over Secession, N.Y. TrIEs, June 14, 1993, at A3.
' Philip Shenon, New Assembly Gives Prince Sihanouk Broad Powers, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 15, 1993, at A3.
' Long Live Cambodia, Bus. TmMs (Malaysia), Sept. 29, 1993.
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Sihanouk is taken seriously by foreign diplomats, who must often put up
with his eccentricity. During four days of peace talks in Thailand,
Sihanouk serenaded ambassadors and V.I.P.s with one of his favorite
songs, Autumn Leaves. "With his bulging eyes and famous high-pitched
delivery, Prince Norodom Sihanouk stole the show. Such was his inspira-
tion that at one point the representatives of the five permanent members
of the United Nations Security Council burst into Happy Birthday, even
though it was not his royal highness's birthday. 'We didn't know the
words to anything else,' one said." 5 The members of the United Na-
tions recognized that Sihanouk's involvement in the peace process would
be instrumental. On more than one occasion, they have even acceded to
his wishes. For example, after the elections, the United States stated that
it would find it difficult to give aid to the coalition government if the
Khmer Rouge were given a role within the new govemment. 6 Prince
Sihanouk canceled peace talks with the Khmer Rouge and announced that
actions by the United States were severely hampering the RGC's ability
to deal with the Khmer Rouge and to govern Cambodia. 7 The United
States then made an announcement that its prior statement had been
misconstrued and that it would, in fact, give aid to a coalition govern-
ment that included the Khmer Rouge. sg Thus, one commentator noted,
"Although notorious for changing his mind, Prince Sihanouk is recognized
as a key to the stability of a coalition government comprising representa-
tives of his royalist party and the former communist regime that ruled the
country for 14 years." 9
"5 Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia's Prince Poised to Go Home, THE AGE (Mel-
bourne), Aug. 31, 1991, at A4.
' Thomas W. Lippman, Aid is Out if Khmer Rouge Is In, U.S. Tells Cambodia,
WASH. POST, July 19, 1993, at A9. Deputy Secretary of State Clifton R. Wharton, "the
highest-ranking U.S. official to visit Cambodia since before the Khmer Rouge took over
the country in 1975, said he told the Cambodians that 'the United States is not going
to dictate their form of government, but we have a great deal of difficulty with the
Khmer Rouge because of the violence they perpetrated and because they are not
abiding by their agreement to disarm."' Id.
7 See Sihanouk Irked at U.S., WASH. POST, July 21, 1993, at A14.
' See John M. Goshko, U.S. Eases Stance on Cambodia Aid, Official Sees Assis-
tance Even if Government Includes Khmer Rouge, WASH. POST, July 25, 1993, at A21.
"We believe that some recent statements by officials of the U.S. government have been
oversimplified," an unidentified senior U.S. official said. "The impression was develop-
ing, not only in the media but among some of our partners out here in the region, that
we were ruling out flatly any Khmer Rouge participation or any aid to a government
that included them .... We want to clarify that the position is not that airtight." Id.
" Lindsay Murdoch, Sihanouk Delayed By Illness, THE AGE (Melbourne), Sept. 11,
1993 at 9 [hereinafter Murdoch, Sihanouk Delayed].
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3. Sihanouk Gains Political Power
Without a doubt, Sihanouk has been named King and his party was
victorious. But is this political power real? Although it is unclear exactly
what role Sihanouk will have under the constitutional monarchy, it is
highly likely that Sihanouk will play a pivotal role in the new Cambodia.
One observer notes "Cambodia throws into bold relief the distinction be-
tween de jure and de facto versions of political reality. Sihanouk's
centrality to any resolution is a de facto reality reflected in the universal
use of the unofficial, undefined phrase 'head of state' to describe
him." In fact, not only was Sihanouk named "head of state," but the
National Assembly gave him "full and special powers" to do whatever
was necessary "to save [Cambodia] and lead it toward progress and
prosperity. 26'
Furthermore, the royalist party under Sihanouk's son, Prince
Ranaridh, holds the most seats in the parliament and they owe that to
Sihanouk. Ranaridh, who is the First Prime Minister of Cambodia,
admitted this debt when he stated, "One must admit that the situation in
Cambodia makes it necessary to form a government of broad national
union under the high presidency of my father.'" 2
Further, Sihanouk is politically astute and known for his activist
nature. Most experts agree that "[w]hether he exerts political power
directly or behind the scenes, Sihanouk's presence will likely be felt."
This is especially likely to be true in the current legislature, in which no
party holds the two-thirds majority needed to approve the Constitution or
pass legislation.'
Finally, Sihanouk has continued to bolster his immense popularity
among the people. He decided not to have a full coronation ceremony
when he recently ascended to the throne because it would be too great a
Ethan Casey, A Smmary of One Month of Suspense in Cambodia, BANGKOK
POST, June 29, 1993 [hereinafter Casey, Summary].
"' Philip Shenon, Rival Parties In Cambodia Agree to Form a Coalition Govern-
ment, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1993, at A10. In fact, many Cambodians believed this to
mean Sihanouk could exercise absolute power if he so chose. Id.
22 Casey, supra note 260.
Murdoch, Sihanouk Delayed, supra note 259 ("But analysts said Prince Sihanouk,
who abdicated in 1955 to play a more political role, would be in a position to exert
strong authority over the affairs of government").
' Murdoch, Cambodia's Fate, supra note 218. Although the new Constitution says
that Sihanouk should rule and not govern, few people believe that he will be content
to sit on the throne quietly, especially given his history of political meddling. Id.
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cost for his impoverished country to bear.' In addition, he refused a
salary from the new Cambodian government.' Recently, he has donated
money to help flood victims hurt by the monsoon rains in Kompong
Speu province.'
The only thing that could hold Sihanouk back is his ill health. In the
last year, Sihanouk has spent much of his time in Beijing, receiving
treatment for his bone marrow cancer.' In a letter he sent to Hun Sen,
Sihanouk explained that he might not be able to fulfill his role because
of his failing health and his need to be away from Cambodia. "This year
I [Sihanouk] must stay in the Beijing hospital for two or three months.
After leaving the hospital, I must continue to receive medical treatment
until January 1995. I must get this medical treatment in Beijing and
Pyongyang." 9 In fact, Sihanouk has insisted on an amendment to the
new Constitution of Cambodia which allows him to delegate his powers
as head of state should he be unable to fulfill that role for medical rea-
sons.
270
4. The Consequences
Having a leader as strong as Sihanouk will be extremely valuable to
Cambodia. He will bring a modicum of stability in a country that has
seen four different regimes and constant civil war in the last two decades.
In his role as the king, he can break the political deadlocks that will
almost certainly occur. As one observer noted,
[I]f there is an impasse between the governing and royalist parties,
many see Sihanouk in the role of mediator. Sihanouk has said himself
he is willing to accept the largely ceremonial role of head of state who
will 'simply open flower shows'. However, it is transparently clear to all
'5 Charles P. Wallace, Sihanouk Takes Throne in Move Toward Peace, Restored
King Launches Democratic Constitution, Ceremonies Also End U.N. Mandate, L.A.
TuvMS, Sept. 25, 1993, at Al.
2" Sihanouk Rejects A Salary, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 23, 1993, at A13.
' Internal Affairs: Sihanouk Donates 10,000 US Dollars to Help Flood Victims
(National Voice of Cambodia radio broadcast, Aug. 5, 1994).
26 See Cambodia's Sihanouk to Return in April, REUTERS, Mar. 1, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
' Letter from King Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, to Hun Sen, Second
Prime Minister of Cambodia (June 19, 1994) (on file with the author).
2o Sue Downie, Cambodia Delays King's Amendment, UPI, July 13, 1994, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File. Ever the prepared monarch, Sihanouk has
already prepared for his burial. Sihanouk Issues Instructions for Burial Rites, REUTERS,
Mar. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
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that Sihanouk was only making light of what is a very grave matter for
Cambodians, for at stake is the happiness and prosperity of a country
which has not known both for a quarter century. Since he was ousted in
a coup in 1970, the country had not known peace. Cambodians remem-
ber his earlier 29-year rule as the last time they had anything resem-
bling peace."'
Sihanouk can use his influence to overcome deadlocks because he is
popular, powerful, and above the fray.2 For example, Sihanouk is
credited with creating and imposing the current power-sharing structure of
the coalition government, despite the fact that Hun Sen and Prince
Ranaridh initially refused to work together.'m In essence, Sihanouk can
act as the independent, disinterested judiciary that is so lacking in fledg-
ling democracies whose court systems are political creatures. 4
Sihanouk can also fulfill a second function of the courts, to check
the excesses of the other branches of government. 'This [Sihanouk's
position] would keep the Parliament from overthrowing the government
all the time," said Ek Sereywath, Deputy Information Minister. "It's a
27, Peace at Last for Cambodia?, Bus. TIMES (Malaysia), June 2, 1993.
m In fact, Sihanouk takes his role as mediator so seriously that he often goes
beyond breaking deadlocks within his own government. He has attempted to mediate
with the Vietnamese over the immigration law and repatriation of ethnic Vietnamese
problems, the Thai over the plight of nine Thai nationals held for participation in a
coup attempt against the new government, Cambodia to Consider Plea by Sihanouk to
Free Thais, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 20, 1994, at 2. However, Sihanouk may take his
role too seriously as he has called for the new government to recognize the Khmer
Rouge as a step towards peace. Philip Sherwell, International-Sihanouk Call to
Recognise Khmer Rouge, DAILY TEL., Sept. 6, 1994, at 12.
27 Since then, Prince Ranaridh has recognized that "the king has a great mission to
reconcile and unify the nation." Interview with Prince Norodom Ranaridh, First Prime
Minister of Cambodia, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (August 17, 1994). Chea Sim,
chairman of the CPP, also recognizes Sihanouk's role as mediator and was quick to
have the CPP support Sihanouk's call for a cease-fire last May. Interview with Chea
Sim, Chairman of the Cambodian People's Party, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia (July 10,
1994).
' Dennis McNamara, head of UNTAC's Human Rights Section, stated that his
biggest regret was UNTAC's inability to create a functioning judicial and enforcement
system. Upholding Human Rights After UNTAC, BANGKOK PosT, Aug. 17, 1993. "A
U.N. report stated that the absence of a rule of law 'brings into doubt the longer-term
viability of democratic institutions in Cambodia."' Murdoch, Cambodia's Fate, supra
note 218. The report, written by the United Nations' human rights component in
Cambodia, referred to the intimidation of judges, the absence of a functioning legal
system, prolonged detentions without a trial, prison overcrowding and a "lack of will
on the part of Cambodian authorities to do anything about it." Id.
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check and balance of power."275 Sihanouk has stated that he will reign,
but will not rule and that as king, he will be the first guarantor of
popular power.27 For example, the National Assembly recently passed
an immigration law over which Vietnamese leaders and the United
Nations Secretary General have expressed concern because it would allow
for the expulsion of all of Cambodia's 300,000 ethnic Vietnamese.'
Sihanouk called for the modification of some "paragraphs or phrases in
a spirit of respect for international laws and human rights," before he
would sign it into law. 8 In addition, Sihanouk has on more than one
occasion attempted to protect human rights. He called for the release of
one editor who had been jailed for defamation of a high-level government
official V9 and for an investigation into the assassination of another
newspaper editor.' In addition, he has "called for the arrest and trial
of senior army officers responsible for a spate of killings and human
rights violations" at a secret prison in Battambang province. 8
In addition, Sihanouk could lend his legitimacy to the new govern-
ment. Once he does this, opposition to the new government will decrease
for few Cambodians will fight against a government in which Sihanouk
is the head of state. As the United Nations' military chief in Cambodia,
Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, stated the Khmer Rouge "are in an
' Cambodia King Will Be Able to End Parliament, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1993, at
A9.
276 Wallace, supra note 265.
Vietnam: Further Criticisms for Cambodian Immigration Law, VImNAM INV.
REV., Sept. 19, 1994 available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File. See also
Vietnam: Vietnamese Concerns of Cambodia's Immigration Law, VIETNAM INV. REV.,
Sept. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File; U. Chief Alarmed
at Cambodian Immigration Law, REurERs, Sept. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Cambod File.
' See Cambodia: Sihanouk Gives Green Light to New Immigration Law, REuTERS,
Sept. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
9 King Norodom Sihanouk, Statement of His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk on
the rights and Freedom of the Press in Cambodia (March 25, 1994) (transcript available
from the author). The editor was released on bail the same day. Sihanouk Discusses
"Serious Matter" With Ministers; Editor Released on Bail, RETEaRS, Mar. 28, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Cambod File.
' Letter from King Norodom Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, to the Royal Govern-
ment of Cambodia (Sept. 9, 1994) (on file with the author). The RGC has promised
to make a serious effort to apprehend the persons responsible for the murder. Cambodi-
an Government Issues Statement on Death of Newspaper Editor (National Voice of
Cambodia radio broadcast, Sept. 10, 1994).
23 Mark Dodd, Cambodian Minister Denies Prison Cover-Up, REUrERS, Aug. 15,
1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
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extremely difficult position. After the king is appointed, who will they
fight? The king?"'
Finally, Sihanouk could become the "institutional memory" of the
Cambodian government. In new democracies, the people may not be pa-
tient enough to allow a government to prove that its policies are effective.
Governments can come and go in quick succession. Thus, governmental
policies tend to be short-sighted and can be contradictory to the laws of
previous governments. However, Sihanouk can propose policies with long-
term benefits and make sure that subsequent administrations do not imple-
ment conflicting laws. 3 For example, he has recently called for a ban
on timber exports since uncontrolled logging threatens to turn Cambodia
into a desert by the 21st century." And in response to the suffering
caused by land mines in his country, Sihanouk has also called for the
government to draft anti-mine laws and for the armed forces of both the
RGC and the Khmer Rouge to stop using mines.'
Although the institution of a monarchy may seem antithetical to the
ideals of democracy, Sihanouk's ascension to the throne is not undemo-
cratic. First of all, he is the choice of the people. FUNCINPEC received
a plurality of the votes largely on his popularity. Further, the representa-
tives of the people unanimously appointed him King. Even the Khmer
Rouge have declared their support for his monarchy.
To the contrary, the presence of King Sihanouk will improve the
chances of creating a stable democracy in Cambodia. Sihanouk has
already stated that he favors and will protect democracy. He can break
the deadlocks that often send fragile democracies towards authoritarian
rule. He will confer his legitimacy on future governments, making them
more stable. Finally, he can be the unifying thread that runs through
successive governments. Sihanouk could become one of several monarchs
who are a benefit to the democratic political system of their country.'
Lindsay Murdoch, Cambodia Passes New Constitution, THE AGE (Melbourne),
Sept. 22, 1993.
' This is true even if Sihanouk's party loses power since the King will still retain
his position, popularity, and veto powers. And given his popularity, it is unlikely that
the King will be dethroned in the near future. In fact, the greatest threat to Sihanouk
is his advanced age (he is 71 years old) and the fact that he has cancer.
" See Maja Wallengren, Cambodia's Sihanouk Calls for Log Export Ban, REUTERS,
Oct. 18, 1994, available in LEXIS, Asiape Library, Cambod File.
"' Sihanouk Reiterates Call Against Use and Sale of Landmnines, REUTERS, Oct. 6,
1994, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File. Cambodia has one of the
highest percentages of amputees in the world as a result of 8-10 million land mines
being planted in its soil. Cambodia to Consider Plea by Sihanouk to Free Thais,
BANGKOK POST, Sept. 20, 1994.
Other examples include the English monarchy, the Japanese monarchy, and the
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5. Causation
In this section, we will first determine whether Sihanouk's gain in
political power was related to the elections. Next, we will answer the
question whether Sihanouk could have gained political power without
elections. Finally, we will determine if there were other factors that lead
to his rise.
At first glance, it might seem that the elections had little to do with
Sihanouk's gain in political power. Given that Sihanouk undoubtedly has
more political power than before the elections, it is surprising that he did
not run in the elections at all. And history shows that there are many
ways to achieve political power other than elections, including through
conquest and coercion. This hypothesis becomes even stronger when the
person coming to power has the support of a large part of the populace.
Thus, there is the possibility that the elections had little to do with
Sihanouk's rise to power and that Sihanouk gained political power in
other ways.
However, the reality of the situation belies this theory. Although
Sihanouk was popular, he was simply unable to translate that popularity
into power. In Cambodia, legitimacy and power have not gone hand-in-
hand since Sihanouk's overthrow in 1970. Lon Nol was only popular
among the urban, educated classes and was propped up by U.S. aid. The
Khmer Rouge managed to alienate large portions of the Cambodian
population through their brutality. The SOC was installed by the much-
hated Vietnamese in the aftermath of a foreign invasion. The main reason
that Sihanouk was not able to effectively use his popularity was that he
had little access to the citizens under the control of the other factions. In
Cambodia, power is an end in and of itself. It does not need legitimacy
to sustain it. Only elections made clear the connection between political
legitimacy to political power. Free and fair elections require unrestricted
access to the people. After Sihanouk was allowed this freedom, it was no
surprise that FUNCINPEC won. He was able to use the elections as a
vehicle to directly translate his popularity into an electoral victory. Once
that occurred, the inherent pressures of the system to give the winner the
spoils insured that Sihanouk had would be given some political power.
In addition, it is unlikely that other methods could have given
Sihanouk the amount of political power we noted above. Although his
popularity with the people has not flagged since he was overthrown,
Sihanouk has been largely powerless for the last twenty-four years. If
Sihanouk had not been able to gain power in the absence of elections in
Thai monarchy.
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those twenty-four years despite his widespread and enduring popularity,
there is no reason to believe that he would be able to take political
power in 1993 in the absence of elections.
Although the elections were critical to Sihanouk's increase in politi-
cal power, much credit must be given to Sihanouk himself. It was
possible that Sihanouk, old and sick, may have sought to retire instead of
campaigning for his party during the elections. Furthermore, there was no
guarantee that Sihanouk would have accepted the political power even if
offered to him, for such political power brings with it much responsibili-
ty. Fortunately, this did not come to pass.
In conclusion, it is fairly clear that the elections had a great deal to
do with the benefit. Furthermore, there was empirical evidence that
without the elections, Sihanouk would not have been able to gain political
power. Finally, one must give credit to the willingness of the man
himself for availing himself of the power of elections and agreeing to be
the head of state for his country.
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
A. Introduction
The elections in Cambodia raise several questions, the most salient
of which is, "are elections beneficial even if they are not democratic
or do not lead to a stable democratic regime?" However, note that with
regard to elections, being democratic and bringing about a stable democ-
racy are not the same. Although the distinction will be discussed later in
greater detail, it suffices for now to assert that the elections in Cambodia
were democratic, but it is unclear whether they will bring about a stable
democracy. This uncertainty forces us to ask two more questions. The
first question is, "would a democratic or nondemocratic government be
preferable in Cambodia?" The second question is, "how do we achieve
the preferable goal?" After answering these questions, this Article will
then unify the conclusions deduced to determine the possible scenarios
when an election occurs and the attractiveness of each scenario. Finally,
the Article will apply the conclusions to Cambodia.
B. The Distinction Between Elections That Are Democratic and Elections
That Lead to Stable Democracy
Before determining whether an election can be beneficial even if it
is not democratic or does not lead to a stable democracy, it may be
' For the purposes of this Article, the term "democratic elections" has the same
meaning as "free and fair elections."
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useful to make a distinction between elections that are democratic and
elections that lead to a stable democracy. The two terms do not denote
the same thing. An election is democratic when it is fairly administered
to grant equal voting rights to every citizen who has the requisite facul-
ties necessary to vote (e.g., in America, most persons over eighteen years
of age). In addition, all eligible voters must be allowed to run for office
and all candidates must have an equal opportunity to campaign. Finally,
the results must be accurately tabulated and the victorious candidates
placed into office. 8 According to this standard, elections in 18th centu-
ry England were not free and fair because a major portion of the citizen-
ry was precluded from voting. 9 More recent elections in totalitarian
countries such as the People's Republic of China are also not free and
fair. Even though suffrage is widespread, only a small number of people
are allowed to be candidates.'l Finally, elections like those held in the
Philippines during the Marcos regime were not democratic because the
failure to tally accurately the votes insured that the candidate with the
most votes would not be placed into office.29
Notwithstanding these inherent procedural guarantees of free and fair
elections, such elections need not lead to a stable democracy. Citizens
could choose, in free and fair elections, not to have a democracy.'
This can occur because democracy is both a method and a choice.
Democracy is a method of making policy decisions for the community.
And one of the policy decisions to be made is what method to use in the
See supra note 1.
Before 1832, suffrage was restricted to male English subjects who possessed a
freehold interest in any real property worth 40 shillings a year which had been assessed
to the land tax for at least six months. DAvID CRESAP MOORE, THE PoLrCS OF
DEFERENCE: A STUDY OF THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH POLMCAL SYSTEM
247 (1976).
Chinese electoral laws stipulate that there can be no more than 100% more
candidates than slots for deputies to the People's Congress. "Please Cast A Vote for
Me" - How New Deputies to Township County People's Congresses Are Elected in
Beijing, XINHuA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 3, 1993, available on LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Cambod File. Therefore, meetings are held in order to limit the number of candidates.
Id
291 See Norman Kempster, American Says Manila Official Admitted Fraud, L.A.
TiMES, Feb. 22, 1986, at 1.
' However, this first scenario brings with it troubling questions whether one group
of voters may commit other, future groups of voters to a specific form of government.
Fortunately, this has been a rare occurrence in modern times. It is not clear whether
this is because of some inherent universal appeal of democracy or through widespread
educational efforts. However, it is clear that people prefer democracy to such an extent
that even nondemocratic governments must at least make the rhetoric of democracy.
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future. Thus, it is possible that the voters will elect a representative who
espouses nondemocratic ideals or is generally regarded as unlikely to
continue democratic governance. A second scenario in which free and fair
elections do not lead to a stable democracy occurs when elected leaders
or representatives decide to take power and refuse to govern the country
in a democratic manner. Finally, one could imagine a situation where the
members of a democratically elected coalition government cannot agree
on how the country is to be administered and resort to violence to settle
their differences.
C. Inherent Benefits of Free and Fair Elections
Now that the distinction is clear, it is necessary to split the first
question posed into two parts. Are elections beneficial even if they are
not democratic? And are they beneficial even if they do not lead to a
stable democracy? In answer to the second question, this Article has
argued that even when elections do not lead to a stable democracy, they
may have benefits. These benefits are inherent in any free and fair
election and do not depend upon the short- or long-term outcome of the
elections. They can be divided into two categories, those based on
legitimacy, which have been the central focus of this Article, and those
related to dignitary and participatory values.
1. Legitimacy-based Benefits
Legitimacy-based benefits are those benefits that stem from the fact
that elections signify the will of the people. The people are a source of
political legitimacy and they bestow this legitimacy by voting for candi-
dates or parties. To understand this, one must start with the premise that
people have the right to decide how they will live, both as individuals
and as a community. However, in many instances, people delegate this
political power to their representatives. This is done not because delega-
tion is necessary by the inherent nature of the political power, but
because it is more efficient to do so. We live in a complicated world
where we do not have the time to participate personally in every govern-
ment decision; nor would it be practical to allow the personal participa-
tion of every citizen in every government decision. Representative gov-
ernment makes it possible for every citizen's voice to be heard given the
pragmatic constraints we face.293 Thus, voting is one form of delegation
2 Of course, there are imperfections in this system that may make it inferior to the
true participatory democracy of Ancient Athens. These problems arise from the tendency
of representative systems to simplify the opinions of many people into a coherent
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of the political power and free, and fair elections are a shorthand way of
insuring that a delegation of power is valid. If legitimacy is defined as
the right to wield political power,294 then the elected representative gains
legitimacy through free and fair elections.
It is in this way that elections give force to the wishes of the people.
And as we have seen, when something is legitimized through elections,
there are profound benefits beyond merely placing a candidate into office.
These benefits of free and fair elections have been detailed in this Article.
They include the ostracization of destabilizing groups, the creation of a
legitimate government which has an incentive not to become illegitimate,
and the transfer of political power to persons who are widely popular.
First, in many nondemocratic countries, there will be a faction whose
military power is greater than its political legitimacy. When faced with
free and fair elections, these groups will shy away from participation.
Elections force parties which fit into this category to identify themselves
as a group which fears democratic methods of selecting leaders. This is
particularly helpful because many of these organizations are highly
secretive and keep strict discipline among members. Attempting to obtain
and verify intelligence on them by other methods is extremely difficult.
In addition, there is a strong likelihood that the self-identification will be
accurate. Those who know the faction best, the leaders of the group, are
responsible for making the identification. At the least, one could not hope
for an identification from a more knowledgeable source.
Identifying and weakening such parties is of special importance
because the existence of such groups endangers fragile democracies. Such
groups need to be identified so that they can be excluded from the new
government. They are likely to resort to force when the situation turns
sour and their fortunes change. Because they are stronger in the military
arena than within the confines of a political power-sharing arrangement,
such groups will prefer the former when the latter fails as a vehicle for
achieving their goals. This endangers the stability of any new government,
making it essential that such groups be excluded. Fortunately, the realities
of free and fair elections make it unlikely that such groups will partici-
pate and do well in elections. Once the elections are over, identifying
these groups helps to insure that the members of the coalition government
will not later offer them a role in governing the country.
Given that such groups should not be a part of the new government,
it is essential that they be weakened because they will oppose the govern-
whole (the representative) and the distancing of people from their government. Nonethe-
less, no other viable options exist at this point.
' See supra note 12.
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ment at every turn. Fortunately, elections inherently weaken these parties,
who will lose domestic and international support by admitting that they
lack domestic legitimacy. The fact that a party has refused to participate
in elections when the United Nations is running the elections speaks for
itself. It would be difficult to point to a better body to administer elec-
tions in a free and fair manner and most of the world's governments
know this. Over time, many of the people of the country in which
elections are being held will come to recognize this as well. And with the
end of the Cold War, there will be no more support for a group merely
because another superpower supports -its opposition. Each client must
prove to its patron that it has not only the power, but the legitimacy,
necessary to eventually "win." A faction that voluntarily chooses not to
participate in free and fair elections can hardly argue that it has the
domestic legitimacy necessary to succeed. Such a faction is clearly
imposing its power upon the citizenry rather than deriving its power from
the people.
The flip-side of this is that without the Cold War, superpowers and
regional powers will seriously consider whether they want to associate
with such a faction. Where a patron nation is looking for a face-saving
way to drop an ally, elections provide a unique opportunity. In order for
elections to be free and fair, aid to a specific faction must be stopped.
After the elections, aid being sent to the country must be sent to the
legitimate government. Any other action will be seen as an attempt to
overthrow the legitimate government by a foreign country. In international
law, such an action would be illegal29 and on practical grounds, it
would surely be resented by the United Nations and its members, who
will have spent much time and money setting up the legitimate govern-
ment. Thus, elections are a catch-22 for unpopular and undemocratic
groups which can only cause them to lose popularity.
The second legitimacy-based benefit of elections is that they have the
ability to create a stable government which possess both political power
and political legitimacy. Although this does not preclude the possibility of
revived conflict in the future, it does decrease that possibility. It allows
the different parties a forum in which to work together. This increases the
likelihood that the parties will cooperate to deal with destabilizing third-
parties and makes cooperation more efficient when the parties decide to
do so. At the least, the different parties have an opportunity to learn the
value of compromise. Further, parceling power gives each party a stake
in defending the system. A party that withdraws from the government
will lose domestic and international support. This is not a foolproof
method of developing a peaceful, functioning government, but it is superi-
295 U.N. CHARTa art. 2, $14.
45719961
CASE W. RES. J. INTL L.
or to other methods.
The final legitimacy-based benefit is the granting of political power
to those who already possess political legitimacy. Where there is someone
with widespread political support, it is unlikely that the convictions of the
people are misguided. Elections use that high level of political legitimacy
to determine whether that person ought to hold a leadership position and
its concomitant powers. Although this method of choosing upon whom to
confer political power is not foolproof, it is superior to other ways of
choosing. Such a person, because he or she is trusted by all factions, is
in a unique position to mediate between the sides. He or she could be the
conscience of the government, protecting democracy and human rights.
Finally, he or she could also lend legitimacy to the fledgling government.
2. Dignitary and Participatory Benefits
In addition to the legitimacy-based benefits, free and fair elections,
whether they lead to a stable democracy or not, have dignitary and
participatory benefits. However, these benefits are more subtle and much
harder to describe. They tend to have consequences that are less dramatic
than legitimacy-based benefits.2" Participatory benefits are integrally
associated with the act of voting in elections. Simply stated, participation
in elections increases self-esteem and one's sense of control. By giving
people a chance to affect their lives at the level of national policy-
making, it makes people aware of their own power. They are made to
recognize their ability to fundamentally change their lives. This has
especially pronounced effect in countries where fatalism and politics go
hand in hand. This opens up new possibilities as a person's sense of the
world changes. Activities and goals that had never crossed people's
minds, such as expressing their opinions to large groups of people and
even running for office, become viable options. Further, this new-found
sense of control need not be limited to politics, but may manifest itself
in other areas as well. And this is all true even if one's opinion does not
carry the day. People can nonetheless feel a sense of pride when their
input is heard and seriously considered. It is no surprise that people are
more likely to acquiesce to a decision in which they have input, even if
their suggestion is not followed.
Related to these benefits are dignitary benefits. The latter based on
the realization that people are autonomous entities. In order to respect this
autonomous nature, people should be given the power to give input when
decisions that substantially affect their lives and their communities are
296 This difficulty in quantifying or concretizing participatory and dignitary benefits
is one of the reasons that this Article focused on legitimacy-based benefits.
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being made. There is an inherent value in doing this that cannot be
explained in practical terms. Even if the citizens do not react or are slow
to change their ways, the benefit still remains because dignitary values
are motivated" by a moral imperative rather than policy analysis. We
ought to have democracy because it promotes the inherent good of
autonomy, not because it makes everyone happy. Only by heeding what
people believe can one vindicate values such as self-determination and
autonomy.
D. Elections That Are Not Free and Fair
In contrast to the plethora of benefits inherent in free and fair
elections, it is difficult to find any benefits of elections that are not free
and fair. An election is not a magical process shrouded in mystery; it is
no more than a formal process of having persons make a choice concern-
ing who will lead them or what policies their community will follow. By
limiting participation, limiting candidate choices, or limiting the conse-
quences of election results, elections can easily be denuded of both
legitimacy-based and dignitary-participatory benefits.
Elections that are not free and fair are not legitimate, thus destroying
any legitimacy-based benefits. Unpopular groups cannot be delegitimized.
Parties in an illegitimate government lose no legitimacy when they flee
that government. And to the extent that widely popular leaders participate
in and emerge victorious from undemocratic elections, they actually lose
legitimacy, decreasing their ability to function as a stabilizing element in
the government.
In addition, where participation in voting is formally or informally
limited, participatory and dignitary benefits are correspondingly limited.
Those values that elections inculcate are lost on those who do not vote.
And failing to allow people to vote violates the notion that people should
be treated as autonomous entities. Most importantly, when elections are
limited, those who are not allowed to vote are often those most in need
of these participatory benefits. Those persons who are used to being told
what to do are normally the first to be excluded.
Limiting candidate choices makes the vote similarly meaningless.
This destroys any participatory values the elections might have because
not allowing citizens to vote for whom they wish is similar to not
allowing them to vote at all.2' Upon seeing the reality of the situation,
I Limiting candidate choices may be better than not allowing voting at all because
voters might still be able to choose among different candidates. Even in nondemocratic
regimes, some candidates may still be more attractive to the populace than others.
However, restricted candidate elections often exclude from candidacy those most likely
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voters are not at all motivated to vote. It is not surprising that in many
countries with one-candidate elections, voting is mandatory. 98 Finally,
the notion that citizens might run for office and directly affect their lives
is destroyed. For these reasons, the dignitary and participatory value of
elections is completely undermined.
Similar problems come about when the results of elections are not
implemented, whether through falsification of results or through refusal to
act on the true results. This makes elections meaningless, a ritual no
better than praying to the heavens for relief. Actions without consequenc-
es cannot give people the sense that they can change their lives. And
because voter choices are neither implemented nor considered in making
a selection, disrespect is shown for the choices of the people. This denies
their right, as autonomous entities, to make choices concerning their lives.
In fact, the limitation of suffrage or candidacy rights or the disregard
for the true outcome of an election not only denude elections of benefits,
but may have detrimental effects as well. Unfree and unfair elections
breed cynicism and contempt. If the nondemocratic government demon-
strates enough times that people cannot change their lives, they will begin
to believe it. If people are shown that the norm is to deprive others of
their right speak, then the people will resort to that in the future.
E. The Path to Stable Democracy
However, the benefits described above are not the only positive
effects of free and fair elections. The creation of a stable democratic
government is probably the most important goal of elections. In contrast
to the benefits mentioned above, however, this benefit is not insured
whenever democratic elections are held. It is easily derailed.
to win. Otherwise, there would be no point to excluding candidates. When the people
are not allowed to vote for their first choice in this way, the damage is serious enough
that the ability to choose the lesser of several evils (approved candidates) does not
adequately remedy the violation.
' Examples include Romania under Nicolae Ceausescu, see Adrian Neagu,
Romanian Peasants Discover the Split Ticket, REUTERS, Sept. 27, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File; the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos, see
Fernando Del Mundo, Police and Military Forces on Full Alert, UPI, April 6, 1981,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File; and Chile under General Augusto
Pinochet, see Charles A. Krause, WASH. POST, Pinochet Wins Overwhelming Vote on
New Constitution, Sept. 12, 1980, at A2.
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1. The Threats to Forming A Stable Democracy
There are two main scenarios in which free and fair elections do not
lead to a stable democratic government. First, the people may decide to
vote for a candidate or faction unlikely to continue democracy in their
country. This is a particular danger in countries in which democracy is
new and the people may have grown accustomed to the assurances that
an authoritarian state afforded to them. Many new democracies are poor
and the voters are likely to concentrate on issues other than continued
democracy, such as the ability to insure economic well-being. The issue
of continued democracy may be the last thing on their minds and they
will vote accordingly. For example, voters more interested in their
livelihoods than in protecting a fragile democracy reelected the members
of the Communist Party in Bulgaria, Albania, and Mongolia after Com-
munism fell in 1989 and 1990. And it was this scenario that the
military in Algeria feared when it canceled the elections in early 1992.
There were no substantiated attacks on the freeness or fairness of the
Algerian elections and the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front (ISF)
party had garnered significantly more votes than any other party in the
first round of voting.' However, the ISF had promised to turn Algeria
into an Islamic fundamentalist state if it won, causing the military to
cancel the second round of voting, which ihe ISF was sure to win."°
A fledgling democracy can also be destroyed through the seizure of
power by its elected officials. Generally, one would fear that the elected
leader of a country would declare an authoritarian rule. History has
several examples of leaders who were elected democratically with the
expectation that they would govern their countries in a democratic manner
and then did away with democracy in their countries.3 One recent
' See Patrick Worsnip, Communist Legacy Persists in the Balkans, REUTERS, June
20, 1990, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Cambod File.
' See Youssef M. Ibrahim, Algeria Militants Call for Uprising, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
14, 1992, at Al. The Islamic Salvation Front received 188 seats of the 231 contested
seats, just 28 short of the number it needed to get a majority in the legislature. The
second place finisher was the Front for Socialist Forces with 26 seats while the
governing party came in third place with 15 seats. Id.
"' See Alfred Hermida, Algeria Election Called Off After the President Quits-Tanks
and Troops Patrol Streets, RETERS, Jan. 13, 1992 available in LEXIS, News Library,
Cumws File. Although an Islamic fundamentalist state is theoretically not incompatible
with democracy, in reality, the two rarely mix. A theocracy requires a unity of belief
that is inimical to democracy. Most Islamic fundamentalist countries are police states
where human rights are not honored (e.g., Iran).
'n Of course, this can occur only in representative democracies, where the citizens
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example is Alberto Fujimori, who was elected in 1990 to the Peruvian
Presidency and two years later dissolved congress, suspended the constitu-
tion, and imposed censorship.3" Alternatively, where no one man or
party has enough power to take control, democracy could end through the
destabilization of the government through inter-party conflict. The parties
of the government would not be able to agree with each other and decide
to go back to fighting. The creation of a democratic state is a complicat-
ed process and experts on democratic processes are often hesitant to
declare the presence of democracy within a generation.'
2. The Value of Democracy
However, our analysis of threats to a stable democracy presupposes
that democracy is a goal worth achieving. Although the debate about
democracy's inherent worth is beyond the scope of this Article, it may be
useful to note the main contours of the debate. In nondemocratic coun-
tries, detractors of democracy have two main arguments, one based on the
inherent nature of democracy and the other based on the practical impos-
sibility of democracy."
First, they point to the inefficiency and chaotic nature of democratic
rule. Democracy allows for the creation of a substantial opposition party
which may freely and publicly air its dissension. This leads to confusion
among the populace and anger amongst the leadership. The eventual
result will be chaos, a break down of order, and possibly even civil war.
In addition, democracy presupposes that every individual should work
towards his or her goal, even if it be at cross-purposes to others. This
leads to shortsighted and incoherent planning in which no attention is
paid to the good of the community as a whole.
In addition, allowing decision-making power to be held by the
populace presupposes some minimum level of education necessary to
trust their representative leaders to make policy, largely without input. In a true
democracy this could not happen. However, almost all democracies today are represen-
tative democracies.
' Peru's Leader Dissolves Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1992, at A5.
304 HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 266-67.
' There is at least one other argument against democracy - that it does not
adequately protect the rights of minorities (i.e., persons who are different in one way
or another from the majority of the population, not just ethnic minorities) and allows
tyranny of the majority. I omit this argument from discussion because it is more often
made by persons living in democratic countries who wish to increase the number of
civil protections afforded to the citizenry. Most of the detractors of democracy in
nondemocratic countries are arguing in favor of what amounts to tyranny of the
minority and less civil protection for the people.
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make an informed decision. The populace of countries where democracy
is emerging often have low levels of education. And without this pre-
requisite, the people will be easily swayed by demagogues and be unpre-
pared to make complicated policy decisions. The best way to improve the
situation is through increased stability, which will lead to economic
progress, which will lead to better educational opportunities for all.
However, the promise of democracy has never been political rational-
ity. Democracy is valuable for the dignitary and participatory values noted
above. Further, arguing that democracy leads to chaos or stalemate does
not answer the normative question whether democracy is superior to
authoritarian forms of government. Although democracy attempts to cater
to the needs of the many, risking chaos or stalemate, authoritarian re-
gimes cater to the needs of the one or the few, courting disaster. It is
often preferable in governing to be restricted to doing nothing rather than
be given unbridled freedom to do something detrimental. Thus, it is not
surprising that although the record of policy-making in democratic coun-
tries has been mixed, it is certainly no worse than the record in authori-
tarian countries. Finally, democracy can actually increase stability rather
than causing instability as has been argued. Democratic governments fear
a loss of domestic and international support and therefore have a reason
to stay democratic. Losers in elections have incentives to stick within the
process because they hope for future success. Further, by creating a
peaceful process of transferring power, democracy furthers stability by
doing away with violent power struggles during autocratic successions.
The second argument made by the detractors of democracy similarly
rests on inaccurate assumptions. It presupposes that the way to deal with
the poor, uneducated masses is to disregard their opinions, at least for the
time being. Proponents of such arguments believe that, by contrast,
democratic governance would require following the opinions of such
persons. This is true, but this argument does not take into account the
inherently educational nature of democracy. Democracy is predicated on
the assumption that there will be a free exchange of information and
incentives for candidates to educate the citizenry. It is this educational
component of democracy that makes it superior to the authoritarian
method of decision-making, which because it has stifled certain opinions
cannot take into consideration the same number of viewpoints. This in
turn greatly decreases the amount of information that the authoritarian
rulemaker has at his disposal and the number of options from which he
must choose. Thus it is not surprising that there is no evidence that
authoritarian rulers make better policy choices than their subjects or even
that poor, uneducated voters make worse decisions than their brethren in
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more developed countries. °1
3. The Stability-Democracy Tradeoff
It is not surprising that there is general agreement that democracy is
a desirable goal. The question then becomes how to get there, over which
there is no general agreement.' Traditionally, the belief has been that
democracy and stability3 .8 are not compatible. Democracy allows open
dissension which means that persons can advocate whatever actions are in
their best interest. However, democracy relies upon elections and the
guarantee that the elections will be free and fair as the means by which
varied opinions and interests are transformed into coherent policy deci-
sions. The problem is that the mechanism of free and fair elections is not
self-enforcing. Those who have lost in elections may decide not to abide
by the results of the elections. Thus, democracy has unleashed a large
number of beliefs and passions that it may not be able to control. Where
the government is not able to put force behind the election results,
stalemate occurs. Where force is placed behind the election results,
outright warfare may erupt, something that might seem remote to the
United States, but is very much a problem in Cambodia.3" Authoritarian
rule, although it too is susceptible to conflict, is less affected because it
has not allowed the full spectrum of opinions to be heard.
Therefore, the comparison that is made is normally between an
unstable, democratic government and a stable, undemocratic govern-
ment 1 However, with regard to Cambodia, one needs to have this
discussion within the context of a regime that is formally democratic.
Even democratic governments face the stability and democracy tradeoff.
In the United States during times of emergency, many of our democratic
freedoms have been curtailed in the name of stability. President Lincoln
jailed many political prisoners and suspended habeas corpus during the
0 Because the Cambodian people have more at stake in elections, they care more.
This factor of caring seems to make a bigger difference than economic or educational
factors. Elections in similarly poor countries bring the vast majority of the people to
the polling stations and voting can often involve intense discussion beforehand.
"o INTRODUCTION TO CAPITALISM, SocIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY REVISITED XII
(Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1993).
' By stability, I mean a decrease in the military conflicts and physical violence and
an increase in the peace.
It is no surprise that most analyses of the American Civil War discuss democrat-
ic politics. That war was very much about what happens when dissension cannot be
resolved peacefully.
310 One common contrast is between the former Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China.
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Civil War" President Roosevelt interned thousands of Japanese citizens
into camps during World War II for no other reason than their race."'
President Truman seized steel mills during the Korean War in order to
avert imminent strikes. 3 Each of these actions was supported by argu-
ments of insuring national security and the Cambodian government could,
with equal or greater plausibility, invoke national security to commit
similar acts.314 After all, it is in a battle to death with the Khmer Rouge
for its very survival.
The wisdom of trading greater democracy for stability in the demo-
cratic context, however, depends upon the situation of the country. Where
the country is prosperous and has a history of democratic rule, such as in
the case of many Western democracies, it may make little sense to curtail
democracy in order to increase stability and efficiency. However, Cambo-
dia poses a different problem. There, the people are more interested in
daily survival than democracy. When a person's preoccupation is with
economics, it is common to believe that democracy is a system which
quickly brings about economic success through some mystical process or
a system whose sole purpose is to allow everyone to get as much of the
pie as he or she can. Whether one has the dynamic (pie-increasing) or
static (pie is the same, but I get a larger share) model of democracy, one
is surely going to be disappointed by the results. The truth is that democ-
racy is not a guarantee of economic success. Economic success comes
about both in democratic (e.g., United States, Germany, Japan) and un-
democratic countries (e.g., Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore,). Nor does
democracy stave off economic failure (e.g., India)?
3" See Ex Parte MUlligan, 71 U.S. 2 (4 Wall.) (1866); Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F.
Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
"' See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
33 See Youngstovn Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 72 U.S. 1075 (1952).
14 And it is not a surprise that publics in South America breathe a sigh of relief
when an authoritarian executive officer breaks the deadlock of democratic inefficiency.
"According to one poll, three-quarters of the population backs Fujimori's action because
it is disgusted with a political system that seems incapable of relieving the grinding
poverty in Peru." Norman Kempster, Bush Vows to Back Democracy in Peru, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 11, 1992, at A8.
3,5 See ScoTr MkiNwAR G, GuiLLERMO O'DONNELL & J. SAMUEL VALENZUELA,
IssuEs IN DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: THE NEW SouTH AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECrivE 8-11 (Scott Mainwaring et al. eds., 1992). Although few
stable democracies are economic failures, the causal relation may be trickier to pin
down than one might think. A failure to bring about economic success may cause great
instability in a young democratic government, as in the case of several South American
countries. Id.
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4. Elections Can Lead to Stability and Democracy
The contribution of this Article, however, is the recognition that the
tradeoff may not be as stark as we may think. There are two stages in
representative democracy - voting by the people and policy-making by
their elected representatives. In Cambodia, free and fair elections, a
democratic action by the people, were held. This first stage led to results
that tend to increase stability. Furthermore, these stabilizing results
constrain the choices made during the second stage. Representatives are
less likely to destabilize the government through their policy-making.
First, the Khmer Rouge, the group most likely to destabilize the demo-
cratic governance of Cambodia, have been excluded. Secondly, each of
the factions has a reason to stay within the government in order to
continue receiving both international and domestic support. Finally, the
role of the neutral, respected elder being filled by Sihanouk helps to
decrease dissension through his dispute resolution skills. Thus, the de-
struction of a fledgling democratic government is made less likely by free
and fair elections.
Furthermore, this stability feeds upon itself. Although there are no
set requirements for a democracy to become a "stable democracy," the
longer a democracy continues, the better its chances of survival. In the
modem era, almost no democracy in existence for more than twenty years
has been overthrown from within. This is because the participatory and
dignitary benefits grow in strength making the idea of nondemocratic
seizure of power unthinkable and widespread resistance to such an act
inevitable. It is also because there is an agreed upon, peaceful method of
transferring power. There is a recognition that the winner of elections is
guaranteed his spot and that the loser can always come back later. Partici-
pants in the government are given a stake in it.
E. Four-Grid Analysis
It may be helpful at this point to unify the ideas discussed above by
using a four-grid analysis. If we imagine the freeness and fairness of
elections on one axis and the eventual outcome (nondemocracy or stable
democracy) on the other axis, we come up with four possibilities as
follows. Using this grid, we can apply what we have learned to other
situations.
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Democratic Undemocratic
Elections Elections
Stable Democratic elections Undemocratic elec-
Democracy that do lead to a tions that do lead to
stable democracy. a stable democracy.
Unstable Democratic elections Undemocratic elec-
Democracy that do not lead to a tions that do not
stable democracy. lead to a stable
I_ I democracy.
Elections which are not free and fair and do not lead to democracy
are unlikely to be of any benefit to anyone other than the persons who
are kept in power. Such elections make a farce of voting and give rise to
cynicism and demoralization. Furthermore, the lack of democratic gover-
nance allows people to grow accustomed to authoritarian or totalitarian
rule. Although such elections may have some beneficial consequences,
these are indirect at best.
Assessing elections that are not free and fair but do lead to democra-
cy is more difficult. Here, we can point to at least one benefit, ostensibly,
democracy. However, there is a causal problem related to this scenario.
When elections are not free and fair, they cannot lead directly to democ-
racy. At best, the elections are a catalyst or focal point for beliefs and
goals that are external to the elections. Such ideas may have come from
a number of sources, ranging from mistreatment by the current govern-
ment to education on the benefits of democracy. Elections are not a
necessary condition for the toppling of an authoritarian or totalitarian
regime and installment of a democratic regime. It may be necessary to
have elections to actually choose a democratic government, but a demo-
cratic system may be put into place without an election at all. There
needs only be the intention to have elections in the future. Finally, the
causal link that we identified above is weak and hardly certain. Relatively
few rigged elections lead to a democratic regime. Therefore, we must be
cautious in ascribing a large benefit to nondemocratic elections in general.
This should hold equally true even if they should lead to democratic
regimes.
Similar to the situation where nondemocratic elections lead to a
democratic system, one would be cautious in cheering a situation in
which elections are free and fair, but democracy does not take root. After
all, one of the main purposes of elections is to start a democracy. How-
ever, the populace does receive the participatory and dignitary benefits
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that may set the stage for another attempt at democracy."6 In addition,
this Article has attempted to show that benefits may accrue to a country
in which free and fair elections are held, but in which democracy may
not eventually take hold or it is unclear that democracy will take hold.
As described above, these benefits come from the legitimation function of
elections and they tend to have a stabilizing effect on the country.
For this reason, the chances that a country which has just had free
and fair elections will become a stable democratic state are greater than
we may think. And if this were to happen, it would be difficult to point
to the downside. This is probably the best scenario for which one could
hope, for the country in question receives both the inherent benefits of
free and fair elections and the stability of democracy.
F. Cambodia, the Future?
Where then, does Cambodia fit into all of this? The elections in
Cambodia were almost certainly free and fair. It is true that they were
marred by intimidation and coercion by the SOC and attacks on polling
stations by the Khmer Rouge. However, neither of those parties won the
election. In contrast, the party that won a plurality of the votes,
FUNCINPEC, used neither intimidation against the other parties nor
military-style attacks on polling stations. It is not surprising then, that
almost all of the international observers present hailed the elections as
being substantially free and fair. Thus, we can be certain that the benefits
inherent to democratic elections will accrue to Cambodia's advantage. 317
However, it is uncertain whether Cambodia's government will be demo-
cratic in the long run. There are three threats: that the Cambodian people
did not really vote for democracy at all; that their leaders will attempt to
seize power, and that their leaders will not able to peacefully govern the
country together and resume fighting. First, it could be argued that there
is simply no mandate for democracy in Cambodia. The citizenry have not
voted for democracy because, in reality, none of the factions stands for
316 Professor Samuel Huntington notes that "in the twentieth century, very few
countries created stable democratic systems on their first try." HUNTINGTON, supra note
2, at 270. Further, of 29 countries involved in the 'Third Wave of Democratization"
[which started in 1974 with the democratization of Portugal], 19 had one or more years
of democratic experience in the post-World War II period and of the remaining 10,
another 4 had significant democratic experience before the war. Id. at 271.
"' See William Branigin, U.N. Ends Cambodian Operation, Mission Successful
Despite Flaws, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1993, at A12. Thus, commentators have noted
that, "even though human rights abuses continue to be committed, the U.N.'s mission
in Cambodian has impressed upon the people, perhaps for the first time, that they do
have rights." Id.
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democracy. Although all of the parties participating in the elections stated
that they supported continued democracy in Cambodia, none has yet
proven this commitment. And it is likely that the Cambodian voter
concentrated on other factors such as economics, the personalities of the
candidates, and past history to make voting decisions."8 Continued
democracy was not as relevant a consideration as continued survival.
However, the Khmer Rouge's failed boycott of the elections is one
indication that the people "voted for democracy." According to this
argument, those persons supporting the Khmer Rouge by refusing to vote
should be counted as supporting a nondemocratic regime. Since few
people boycotted the elections and the vast majority of citizens voted for
one of the parties which formally supported democracy, it was clearly a
vote for democracy. However, there are two problems with this argument.
First, even the Khmer Rouge spouted the rhetoric of democracy.' 9
Second, the Khmer Rouge have too much historical baggage attached to
their name. Refusal to support the Khmer Rouge may have had more to
do with fear of a Khmer Rouge return to power than a love of democra-
cy.
An even more compelling argument is based on the enthusiasm and
zeal with which the Cambodian people involved themselves in the demo-
cratic process. A high percentage of the registered voters cast their ballots
despite the threats of attacks by the Khmer Rouge and a great number of
people campaigned despite the harassment and killings by the SOC. This
fact supports the argument that the high election turnout was a mandate
for democracy in and of itself. If the Cambodian people had not favored
democracy, they would not have involved themselves so widely and so
deeply in a process that is the core of democracy?2
However, the unclear nature of the mandate is a much smaller threat
... Although this cannot be verified substantively, my own talks with citizens in
Phnom Penn revealed that many Cambolans worry about their continued ability to
make a living. These concerns were prevalent during the elections and are still
prevalent today.
3" None of the other factions had any experience with democracy, placing them at
odds with the Khmer Rouge. Notwithstanding the fact that the Khmer Rouge's actions
in the past were more widespread and more reprehensible, its formal support of
democracy and its record of democracy in the past cannot be distinguished from the
other parties.
" In any case, shortly after the elections, the new representatives signed the
Constitution of Cambodia, which calls for periodic elections. See generally Rebels,
supra note 128, at A3. Thus, although the question of a mandate for democracy is
clouded, the RGC has now constituted itself as a democracy. It is unlikely that the
unclear nature of the electoral mandate could overrule the requirements of the new
constitution. Id.
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to democracy than the actions of Cambodia's leaders. Notwithstanding the
optimistic signs in Cambodia during the recent elections, Cambodia's
history is too troubled and its leaders too inexperienced with democracy
for anyone to declare with any certainty that a stable democracy has been
established in Cambodia. It is not beyond the bounds of plausibility that
one faction will seize power or that the government will fall apart as the
factions are unable to compromise. This is the real threat to continued
democracy in Cambodia. Cambodia-watchers should focus on the actions
of the new government rather than the shenanigans of the Khmer Rouge.
V. CONCLUSION
The end of the Cold War is the start of a new era for the United
Nations; one in which it will play a more active role in peacemaking,
peacekeeping, and electoral supervision. Azerbaijan, Macedonia, Georgia,
and Haiti are all sites of possible future U.N. peacekeeping missions.321
In addition to the problems of Cambodia, crises in Somalia, Bosnia,
Croatia, Haiti, El Salvador, Angola, Mozambique, and Iraq have all
landed on the plate of the United Nations."z As of last year, the United
Nations had a presence in fourteen countries, the biggest operations being
in Somalia with 28,000 U.N. personnel and Bosnia-Herzegovina with
24,000 U.N. personnel.3" Such actions are costly in terms of money and
lives. The Cambodia operation, for example, is expected to cost at least
$1.5 billion, plus another $800 million in economic aid pledged. In
addition almost seventy U.N. personnel were killed in Cambodia. 4 The
U.N. plans to spend some $3 billion in 1993 on peacekeeping operations
involving 90,000 personnel." Because of the large cost, there is already
321 See Stanley Meisler, Activist U.N. Leader On Firing Line, His Arrogance
Alienates Many. But Boutros Boutros-Ghali Is the Boldest Secretary General In
Decades, L.A. TMIES, Nov. 9, 1993, at 1.
322 Id.
323 Id.; Warren Strobel, The World's Policeman, Is U.N. In Over Its Head?,
Peacekeeper Role Provokes Debate, WASH. TIMEs, July 13, 1993, at Al. In addition
to the countries listed in the text, U.N. troops are stationed the Western Sahara, Sinai-
Egypt-Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, Syria-Golan Heights, India-Pakistan, and Rwanda. David
Lauter & Paul Richter, Clinton To Insist on U.S. Control of G.Ls in U.N. Roles, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 15, 1993, at Al; Warren Strobel, The World's Policeman, Is U.N. In Over
Its Head?, Peacekeeper Role Provokes Debate, WASH. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at Al.
324 See Sicham Siv & Richard H. Solomon, The U.N. is on the Verge of Retreating
in the Face of a Success, After Years of Bloodshed, a Democratic Government is Near,
Not Extending the U.N. Mandate Would Betray the People, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993,
at M2.
" See Julia Preston, Members of U.N. Failing to Pay Up for Peace Keeping As
Global Missions Multiply, U.S. and Others Withhold Funds, WASH. POST, June 27,
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a reluctance on the part of many nations to contribute to U.N. operations.
In March, 1993, when a request for $150 million was made to help pay
for a portion of the Somalia operation, only $35 million was raised."
Of the $800 million in economic aid pledged to Cambodia, only $150
million has appeared." According to Leo Hosang, the U.N.'s finance
director, member states are some $1.3 billion in arrears in peacekeeping
payments.' The United States itself is nearing $1 billion in arrears.329
As S. Iqbal Riza, U.N. assistant secretary-general for peacekeeping
operations stated, "We are very much at a critical point in determining
whether this concept of collective security, which has worked in a restric-
tive sense during the Cold War, is now going to prove itself valid and
viable.""33
The proponents of U.N. peacekeeping and electoral missions, includ-
ing the U.N. Secretary General, must convince many entities, most
importantly the countries contributing to the effort, of the utility of U.N.
missions.331 Such arguments should be made not only in terms of the
creation of democracy, but also in terms of legitimacy-based and dignitary
and participatory values. In many developing countries today, the chances
of creating a democratic system of government may be slim in the short-
run. Such countries are often miserably poor, have no democratic tradi-
tions, and have experienced widespread warfare between seemingly
implacable foes. Faced with such dismal prospects and domestic budget
restraints, many countries could easily opt to vote against United Nations
intervention. It is easy to see why many are wary of United Nations
actions in Somalia, Haiti, and Yugoslavia. Yet Cambodia possesses all of
the problems that these countries face, perhaps to a greater degree than
any of them. To dismiss intervention then, merely when it is not likely
to achieve instant democracy may be a mistake.
Of course, as our causation analysis showed, there are some prereq-
uisites that are necessary for elections to have their full beneficial effects.
1993, at A25.
" See Jonathan Moore, The U.N.'s New Mission: Nation-Building, With Bosnia and
Somalia, the United Nations Is Now in the Business of Setting Up Governments, But
Isn't That the People's Choice?, L.A. TIMEs, June 27, 1993, at MI.
327 Id.
Preston, supra note 325.
See Paul Lewis, U.S. Peacekeeping Arrears Could Reach a Billion, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 22, 1993, at A5.
o Strobel, supra note 323, at Al.
3 For an example of arguments against spending money to control militants around
the world, see George Melloan, How Much Peace Can Western Money Buy?, Sept. 13,
1993, WALL ST. J.. at A17.
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Surprisingly, these factors were not economic in nature, but were of
psychological origin. The people must be willing to participate in large
numbers and in a meaningful way in elections. The international commu-
nity must be willing to respect the results of the election. The members
of the new coalition must be inclined to work together. Finally, those
with the most political legitimacy must be willing to receive political
power. It is fortunate that Cambodia met all of these requirements.
Notwithstanding these requirements, we must encourage the holding
of free and fair elections wherever possible. Elections bring immediately
the kinds of benefits that we mentioned above and they can bring these
benefits with more surety than the negotiations of diplomats. In turn, the
benefits help create the peace, stability, and prosperity necessary for long-
term democracy. In this sense, Cambodia is well on its way. It is no
wonder then that William Shawcross noted that, "[s]uccess was the right
word" when it came to the United Nations operation in Cambodia. He
stated, "This [the current political situation brought about by the elec-
tions] is not the perfect solution, but it is better than any other Cambodia
has had in more than 20 years of civil war and bloody revolutions."332
332 William Shawcross, The Nightmare is Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1993, at A23.
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